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JURISDICTION
Petitioner seeks review of an Order of the Industrial Commission which granted
Kennecott Corporation's ("Kennecott") Motion for Review and, in so doing, denied
petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing. (A copy of the Order Granting Motion for
Review and the Order of Clarification are attached hereto in petitioner's Addendum as
Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" respectively). U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(12) provides that an Order
of the Industrial Commission concerning a written request for review is subject to judicial
review as provided in U.C.A. §63-46b-16. U.C.A. §63-46b-16 provides:
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicated proceedings.
As such, this court has jurisdiction to review the Order of Clarification and Order Granting
Motion for Review issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah.
ISSUE FOR REVIEW
Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in overturning the Administrative Law
Judge's Order granting petitioner a formal hearing?
Standard of Review: Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(d), this court shall grant relief if
petitioner has been "substantially prejudiced" because the Industrial Commission has
"erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Because this matter presents a question of
statutory construction and legislative intent, this court may review for correctness and need
not defer to the agency's interpretation. Crosland v. Board of Review. 828 P.2d 528, 529-1-

30 (Utah App. 1992). This court must grant relief if it finds that the Industrial Commission
erroneously interpreted the law to petitioner's substantial prejudice. Id.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES AND RULES
Petitioner has attached copies of all provisions, statutes and rules in the Addendum
rather than quoting verbatim each authority cited in the text of this brief. (See Addendum,
Exhibit "C").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Petitioner, Stephen E. Hausknect, filed a charge of age discrimination in

employment with the UADD on or about May 12, 1992.
2.

The UADD entered a no cause determination on November 20, 1992. (A

copy attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "D").
3.

The no cause determination was only based on information submitted to the

UADD by counsel for both parties.
4.

Apparently, the investigator did not interview any witnesses or engage in any

fact-finding investigation, prior to issuing his no-cause determination.
5.

On December 18, 1992, petitioner, through his counsel, filed a Notice of

Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7. l(5)(c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the
Utah Administration Code, requesting an evidentiary hearing on the determination rendered
by the UADD. (A copy attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit ,fEff).
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6.

On March 15, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law Judge,

issued an Order Granting Formal Proceeding. (A copy attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit
"F").
7.

On or about January 4, 1993, Kennecott filed a Response to Complainant's

Request for an Evidentiary Hearing,which unexplicably was not in the file at the time of
Judge Allen's consideration of Hausknecht's hearing request. As a result, Judge Allen set
aside the March 15, 1993 Order for further consideration. (A copy of Response attached
hereto as Addendum Exhibit"G"; a copy of Order Setting Aside Grant of Formal Proceeding
attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "H").
8.

After due consideration, on April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, presiding

Administrative Law Judge for the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order Granting
Formal Hearing Upon Further Review wherein Judge Allen determined that petitioner had
met the requirements of law necessary to show entitlement to a hearing. (A copy attached
hereto as Addendum Exhibit "I").
9.

On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for Review of Judge Allen's

Order granting petitioner a formal hearing. (A copy attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit
"J").
10.

On October 26, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order

granting Motion for Review which "ordered that the Motion for Review of the Order of the
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Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is hereby denied." (A copy attached hereto
as Addendum Exhibit "A").
11.

On November 5, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order

of Clarification wherein it "ordered that [Kennecott's] Motion for Review requesting that the
evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby granted and the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge to grant the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed." (A copy attached hereto as
Addendum Exhibit "B").
12.

Petitioner appeals the Industrial Commission of Utah's Order of Clarification

which reversed the decision of Judge Allen granting petitioner an evidentiary hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's granting of
petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing violated petitioner's right to due process and
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COMMISSION'S REVERSAL OF THE ALPS GRANTING
OF PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING VIOLATED PETITIONER'S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
It is well recognized that "implicit in the due process clause of our State Constitution
is that persons be afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law." Gribble v.
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Gribble. 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978); Constitution of Utah, Article I, §7. The Commission's summary dismissal of petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing deprived him
of his only remedy under the state anti-discrimination laws without petitioner ever having had
a hearing of any kind. Retherford v. AT&T. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). As such, the
Commission's refusal to grant petitioner a hearing constitutes a denial of his right to due
process.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and
requires such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands. In an analysis of a procedure an important factor is
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest
through the procedures, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.
Worrall v. Qgden Citv Fire Department. 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). Here, there has
been an erroneous deprivation of petitioner's interest in a formal hearing by the Commission's refusal to adequately consider petitioner's request for hearing.
In Utah, courts have repeatedly reviewed administrative hearings and proceedings to
determine whether both the procedures are satisfactory and the outcome is fair.

For

instance, in Child v. Salt Lake Citv Civil Service Commission. 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978),
the Utah Supreme Court was asked to review the decision of the Salt Lake City Civil Service
Commission upholding the discharge of the Chief of Police. The court noted that the review
of the Commission's decision was warranted and authorized by the Utah Constitution, Article
-5-

VIII, Section 9. The court then stated that it had the power to grant relief from that decision
if it found that the Commission had "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion." The
court went on to review the decision to determine if the findings and order of the
Commission had been "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Id.
In Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court was asked to overturn the decision of the Industrial Commission on the
grounds that the Administrative Law Judge had previously represented one of the parties in
the hearing. In reaching its conclusion that the decision should be overturned, the court
stated:
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all
parties to a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge.
'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.' (citation omitted)
Id. at 1221.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d
1331 (Utah 1987) emphasized the requirement that every person is entitled to a fair hearing:
. . . every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing
held before an administrative agency, has a due process right
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Anderson v.
Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985).
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but
endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness. Id. at
1221. . . . our review of the record persuades us that the
manner in which the Administrative Law Judge conducted this
hearing was sufficiently unfair as to constitute the denial of
plaintiffs constitutional right to a fair hearing.
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Bunnell, at 1333. Here, it was patently unfair to deny petitioner an opportunity to be heard
in a de novo review hearing.
The requirement that all hearings, including administrative hearings, comport with
minimum standards of fairness was further developed in Tolman v. Salt Lake County
Attorney. 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991). There, the plaintiff challenged the results of a
grievance hearing held before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council on the grounds
that hearsay evidence had been admitted. The court concluded that the admission of such
evidence was unfair because it prevented Tolman from exercising his right to cross-examine
witnesses and therefore violated his right to due process. The court emphasized:
Every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing
held before an administrative agency has a due process right to
receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Bunnell, 740
P.2d at 1333. As a general rule, 'due process demands a new
trial when the appearance of unfairness is so plain, that we are
left with the abiding impression that a reasonable person would
find the hearing unfair.' Id. Note 1.
Tolman. at 28.
The Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's grant of an evidentiary
hearing does not rise to the basic level of fairness enunciated and required by the Utah
Supreme Court.

Importantly, petitioner's remedy under state law for employment

discrimination lies with the UADD pursuant to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, U.C.A.
§34-35-1, et seg. Nevertheless, the UADD performed only a cursory review of petitioner's
claim.

No fact finding was performed.

No interviews were performed nor were
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interrogatories or requests for documents sent to the parties. In short, the investigatory
procedures were wholly inadequate to determine if the discriminatory conduct alleged by
petitioner had occurred. By denying petitioner an evidentiary hearing, the Commissioner
effectively eliminated any sort of inquiry into the truth of and factual bases for petitioner's
allegations of discrimination.
The Commission's refusal to allow petitioner any type of hearing to which he was
entitled violates petitioner's fundamental due process right to receive a fair trial in front of
a fair tribunal. Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985).
Therefore, petitioner respectfully submits that the Commission's Order was improper and
substantially prejudices him by denying him due process of law. As such, the Administrative
Law Judge's Order granting petitioner a hearing should be reinstated.

n.
THE COMMISSION'S REVERSAL OF THE ALPS GRANT
OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING VIOLATES THE
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT.
The Administrative Procedures Act, U.C.A. §63-46b-0.5 et seg. applies to and
governs every agency of the State of Utah. The Anti-Discrimination Act, U.C.A. §34-35-1
et seq. delineates the procedures utilized by the Industrial Commission and the UADD in
adjudicating claims of discrimination. In particular, U.C.A. §34-35-7.1 enunciates the
procedure for aggrieved persons to file a claim alleging discrimination. The Industrial
Commission's rules further provide:
-8-

The adjudicative proceeding referred to in §34-35-7. l(6)-( 10),
U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative hearing which shall occur
following the investigative process referred to in §34-35-7.1(1)(5), U.C.A.
Utah Administrative Code, R 560-1-5. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, §63-46(b)8 sets forth the procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings.
Despite the fact that the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, and the Industrial Commission's own Administrative Rules recognize and
require that a formal adjudicative hearing shall occur following the investigative process, the
Commission overruled Judge Allen's granting of just such a hearing. The Commission's
reversal of Judge Allen's Order was based on the Commission's conclusion that "an
evidentiary hearing was not necessary under the circumstances of this case." (See Order of
Clarification, Exhibit "B" hereto). The Industrial Commission's Administrative Rules are
quite lenient in prescribing when an evidentiary hearing is necessary:
A request for an evidentiary hearing must state a reason why
the hearing is necessary. A hearing will not be considered
necessary if the hearing will not add to the evidence in the
investigatory file or cause the evidence in the investigatory file
to be viewed differently. In most cases, the need to crossexamine the individuals who have submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of the Commission
will be considered a valid reason for granting a request for a
hearing by the Commission.
Utah Administrative Code, R 560-1-4A4. Judge Allen had found that petitioner had met the
requirements by showing that a hearing would add to the evidence in the investigatory file
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or show that the evidence in the file may be viewed differently by the hearing. (See Order
Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review, Exhibit "I" hereto). Based upon Judge
Allen's determination, a formal adjudicative hearing should have proceeded. The reversal
of that decision by the Commission violates the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, and the Industrial Commission's own Administrative Rules.

in.
PETITIONER MADE AN ADEQUATE SHOWING THAT A
HEARING WOULD ADD TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE
FILE AND/OR SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE
WOULD BE VIEWED DIFFERENTLY
AFTER THE HEARING.
Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge, entered his Order granting
petitioner's request for hearing after taking into account both petitioner's reasons supporting
his request and Kennecott's responses in opposition to the request. Specifically, Judge Allen
determined that petitioner had met the requirements of law and had shown "that a hearing
will add to the evidence in the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the file may
be viewed differently by the hearing." In spite of this determination, the Commission
reversed Judge Allen's Order and essentially accepted the UADD's determination verbatim
without giving any credence to the reasons enunciated by plaintiff in his request for a
hearing. Petitioner, therefore, files this appeal on the additional grounds that he sufficiently
showed that a hearing was warranted and that the Commission, in reversing presiding
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Administrative Law Judge Allen's Order, failed to consider the facts and argument presented
by petitioner.
Petitioner requested a hearing because the investigation that was conducted in this
matter was extremely limited. Other than the initial statement submitted by the petitioner,
no affidavits or sworn statements appear to have been provided to the investigator. Because
of the extremely limited nature of the investigation, an evidentiary hearing on this case is
warranted. Additionally, a hearing is needed for the following reasons:
1.

Collection of evidence. Other than certain cursory and conclusory statements

submitted on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent, there has been no admissible
evidence (other than petitioner's initial statement) submitted to the investigator. A hearing
is necessary so that witnesses can be called, testimony taken and various documentary
evidence presented to the Commission;
2.

Cross-examination of the witnesses. A hearing is necessary so that individuals

who have knowledge and information relevant to petitioner's claims can be put on the stand
and cross-examined by the petitioner.

It is well established that cross-examination of

witnesses is a minimum requirement of due process. State of Utah v. Stames. 841 P.2d 712
(Utah App. 1992);
3.

Compel certain witnesses to testify. It is virtually impossible for petitioner,

in support of his UADD claim, to contact Kennecott employees who may be able to provide
testimony which substantiates petitioner's claims. Those individuals would understandably
-11-

be reluctant to voluntarily give statements to petitioner during the investigation inasmuch as
they would fear that adverse employment actions might or will be taken against them. The
investigator never sought testimony from Kennecott's employees. A hearing would provide
petitioner the opportunity to subpoena Kennecott employees who may have testimony
favorable to his position.
As set forth above, the Commission's reversal of Judge Allen's Order granting a
hearing is fundamentally unfair and denies petitioner his right to due process and precludes
him from pursuing its statutory remedies.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, petitioner asserts that the Commission's Order
reversing Judge Allen's Order is fundamentally unfair and denies him his due process right
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal, and violates the provisions of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act and the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act which assure a formal
adjudicative hearing in most instances. Moreover, the Commission's total reliance on the
UADD's determination raises the question of whether petitioner's Request for Hearing and
the facts and arguments set forth therein were ever even considered by the Commission
before it reversed Judge Allen's grant of an evidentiary hearing.
A de novo evidentiary hearing would add to the scant evidence in the case and would
show that the evidence in the investigatory file would be viewed differently. Thus, petitioner
respectfully requests that this court overturn the Commission's decision, and order that
-12-

petitioner be entitled to a formal evidentiary hearing, which comports with the requisites of
the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, §63-46b-8, to review de novo the Determination and
Order of the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division.
-Disc:
DATED this JJ_ day of April, 1994.

Erik Strindberg
Martha S. Stonebrook
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing were

"JUT

HAND-DEUVERED the Jl_ day of April, 1994, to the following:
James M. Elegante

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Thomas C. Sturdy
Sharon J. Eblen
Industrial Commission of Utah
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-6600

(Ij/hausk2.brf)
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I "P"!
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146615
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT,

*
*

vs.

*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

KENNECOTT CORPORATION

*

UADD No. 92-0393
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418

Charging Party,

•

Respondent.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews this
Motion for Review pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-16. The Respondent
has requested review of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ")
Order of April 26, 1993 granting the Charging Party's request for
a formal hearing to review de novo the Determination and Order of
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD").
The Respondent asserts that the Charging Party's request for
a hearing does not comply with the requirements of Utah law for
granting a formal hearing from a determination and order entered by
the UADD. Respondent asserts that the ALJ's order fails to specify
the basis upon which it is granted and that the record does not
support the grant of a formal hearing.
U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c) provides that "[a] party may file a
written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the director's determination and order within 30
days of the date of the determination and order." The UADD rules
provide that "[a] request for an evidentiary hearing must state a
reason why the hearing is necessary.
A hearing will not be
considered necessary if the hearing will not add to the evidence in
the investigatory file or cause the evidence in the investigatory
file to,- be viewed differently.1" The rule notes that "[i]n most
cases, the need to cross examine the individuals who have submitted
affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of
the Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a
request for a hearing by the Commission.2"
The Charging Party's request for a hearing asserts that a
hearing is necessary so that a complete investigation can be done.
The Charging Party asserts that evidence reasonably available to
the investigator would show that the Charging Party did establish
a prima facie case of age discrimination, that there is a need to
take testimony from witnesses such as the Charging Party and the
1

U.A.C. R560-l-4(4) (1993).

2

Id.

Exhibit.^

STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT
ORDER
PAGE TWO
people involved in the decision to terminate him and notes that the
investigator failed to interview witnesses or take affidavits. The
Charging Party further claims that there was "evidence" presented
in the charge that the Charging Party was terminated because his
employer wanted to reduce staff in the facility where the Charging
Party worked without having to pay severance benefits, an issue
which was not addressed by the investigator. The Charging Party
asserts that the Commission needs to take evidence regarding the
Respondent's sexual harassment training policy and to investigate
the allegations that the Charging Party sexually harassed his
female co-workers.
The Respondent asserts that the reasons proffered by the
Charging Party are insufficient to warrant a grant of a formal
hearing because the purpose of a formal hearing is not to conduct
an investigation or collect evidence.
In our review of the file, we find that the Charging Party
failed to submit any evidence in support of his claim during the
UADD's informal investigation. He did not complete and sign an
affidavit upon filing his charge and submitted no documentation or
evidence in support of his claim. Every document submitted by the
Charging Party was argument not evidence. We believe that R560-1-4
contemplates that the party seeking review has fully participated
in the proceedings below. The evidence offered by the Charging
Party appears to have been available during the UADD's investigation, but was not supplied at that time. Therefore, the Charging
Party cannot assert that there is evidence which will support his
claim which was not submitted during the investigation, although it
was available at that time.
It is an elementary concept in employment discrimination law
that the burden of proof rests with the Charging Party.3
The

3

See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdinef 67 L.Ed, ed 207
(1981). Under Burdine, it is the plaintiff's burden to show that
similarly situated employees were not treated equally and,
ultimately, to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.

STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT
ORDER
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Charging Party did not submit the names of witnesses that he wanted
the investigator to interview and, apparently, made no effort to
submit affidavits or other evidence in support of his charge.
We do not think that a party should be allowed to obtain an
evidentiary hearing by claiming that the UADD has failed to
properly investigate the subject charge when the party requesting
the hearing has failed to participate fully in the proceedings
below.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The Charging Party failed to submit evidence in support of
his charge of discrimination during the investigative proceeding.
2. The evidence the Charging Party seeks to submit at this
time was available at the time of the UADD investigation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Therefore, for the above reasons, we find that the Charging
Party has failed to show that an evidentiary hearing is necessary
pursuant to the requirements of R560-1-4. Therefore, we hereby
deny his request for a formal evidentiary hearing.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Review of the
Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is
hereby denied.
If you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals you must
do so within 30 days of the date of this Order. If you want a
transcript of the hearing for your appeal you must bear all the
cost of preparing it.
You also have the right to ask the Industrial Commission to
reconsider this Order, under U.C.A. § 63-46b-13, but you must
request reconsideration within 20 days of the date of this Order.

STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT
ORDER
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You do not have to request reconsideration before you file an
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this ^fJ^

day of

(D<^ZXc^J

1993.

llUtitoM

Stephen M. Hadleyl Chairman

^ ^ V

.<*?>

Colleen S. Colton, Commissioner
I abstain due to my prior association with one of^he parties.

Thomas R. Carlson, Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEWin the case-, of STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT,

Case Number 92-0393, on<£j£L?day of L&z:^fW^-?
following:

, 1 9 ^ to the

ERIK STRINDBERG
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 EAT 100 SOUTH, #500
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146615
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT,

•W

*
*

Charging Party,
vs.
KENNECOTT CORPORATION

*
*
*
*

Respondent.

ORDER OF CLARIFICATION
UADD NO. 92-0393
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418

*

*********************************

On October 26, 1993 the Industrial Commission of Utah
("Commission") issued an "Order Granting Motion for Review"
("Order") in the above entitled case. It would appear that the
Order is internally inconsistent in stating that the Motion for
Review of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge is hereby
denied.
The Administrative Law Judge allowed a request for evidentiary
hearing. Upon review of the file, the Commission concluded that an
evidentiary hearing was not necessary under the circumstances of
this case. We therefore issue this Order of Clarification sua

sponte.

The Order of the Commission dated October 26, 1993 should be
amended to read as follows:
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Respondents Motion for
Review requesting that the evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby
granted and the decision of the administrative law judge to grant
the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed.
If you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals you must
do so within 30 days of the date of this Order. If you want a
transcript of the hearing for your appeal you must bear all the
cost of preparing it.
You also have the right to ask the Industrial Commission to
reconsider this Order, under U.C.A. § 63-46b-13, but you must
request reconsideration within 20 days of the date of this Order.
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STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT
ORDER OF CLARIFICATION
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You do not have to request reconsideration before you file an
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this _J±

cL

day of

4^

J.

., 1993

m^
Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman
*

y */

**«+.;

Colleen S. Colton, Commissioner
I abstain due to my prior association,with one &f the parties.

Thomas R. Carlson, Commissioner
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I. Declaration of Rights
II. State Boundaries
IE. Ordinance
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage
V. Distribution of Powers
VI. Legislative Department
VII. Executive Department
VIII. Judicial Department
IX. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
X. Education
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns
XII. Corporations
XHI. Revenue and Taxation
XIV. Public Debt
XV. Militia
XVI. Labor
XVH. Water Rights
XVm. Forestry
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
XXI. Salaries
XXII. Miscellaneous
XXm. Amendment and Revision
XXIV. Schedule
PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION O F RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in t h e people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
20. [VUitary subordinate to t h e civil power.]
21. [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]

Section
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for t h e abuse of that
right.

1896

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments a r e founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government a s the public welfare may require.
1896
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is a n inseparable part of t h e
Federal Union and t h e Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land.
1896
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — N o property qualification to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting t h e free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or t h e
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for t h e support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear
arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use
of arms.
1984
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or
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34-34-11

34-34-11. Injunctive relief — Damages.
Any employer, person, firm, association, corporation, employee, labor union, labor organization or any
other type of association injured as a result of any
violation or threatened violation of any provision of
this chapter, or threatened with any such violation
shall be entitled to injunctive relief against any and
all violators of [or] persons threatening violation and
also to recover from such violator or violators, or person or persons, any and all damages of any character
cognizable at common law resulting from such violations or threatened violations. Such remedies shall be
independent of and in addition to the penalties and
remedies prescribed in other provisions of this chapter.
1969
34-34-12. Injunction against violating chapter.
In addition to the penal provisions of this chapter,
any person, firm, corporation, association, or any
labor union, labor organization or any other type of
association, or any officer, representative, agent or
member thereof may be restrained by injunction from
doing or continuing to do any of the matters and
things prohibited by this chapter.
1969
34-34-13. Damages for denial or deprivation of
continuation of employment
Any person who may be denied employment or be
deprived of continuation of his employment in violation of this chapter shall be entitled to recover from
such employer and from any other person, firm, corporation or association acting in concert with him by
appropriate action in the courts of this state such
damages as he may have sustained by reason of such
denial or deprivation of employment.
1969
34-34-14. Jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of any action brought to enforce
this chapter is hereby conferred upon and vested in
the district court of the county in which any person,
group of persons, firm, association, corporation, labor
union, labor organization or any other type of association, or representatives thereof, who violates this
chapter, or any part of it, resides or h a s a place of
business, or may be found and served with process.
1969

34-34-15. Existing contracts — Chapter applicable upon renewal or extension.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to
any lawful contract in force on the effective date of
this act, but they shall apply in all respects to contracts entered into after such date and to any renewal
or extension of any existing contract.
1969
34-34-16. Right t o bargain collectively n o t denied.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to deny
the right of employees to bargain collectively with
their employer by and through labor unions, labor
organizations or any other type of associations. 1969
34-34-17. Violation of act a misdemeanor.
A violation of this act shall constitute a misdemeanor, and each day such unlawful conduct, as defined in this chapter, is in effect or continued shall be
deemed a separate offense and shall be punishable as
such, as provided in this chapter.
1969
CHAPTER 35
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT
Section
34-35-1.

Short title.

Section
34-35-2.
34-35-3.

34-35-4.
34-35-5.
34-35-6.
34-35-7.
34-35-7.1.

34-35-8.
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Definitions.
Jurisdiction of Industrial Commission
— Creation of antidiscrimination
division — Co-ordinator of fair employment practices.
Antidiscrimination division — Members — Meetings — Quorum.
Antidiscrimination
division
—
Powers.
Discriminatory or unfair employment
practices — Permitted practices.
Repealed.
Procedure for aggrieved person to file
claim — Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings — Settlement —
Reconsideration — Determination.
Repealed.

34-35-1. Short title.
This shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Anti-Discriminatory Act."
1969
34-35-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Apprenticeship" means any program for
the training of apprentices including, b u t not
limited to, any program providing the training of
those persons defined as apprentices by Section
35-8-5, whether or not such program is registered
and approved by the Apprenticeship Council under Section 35-8-2.
(2) "Bona fide occupational qualification"
means a characteristic applying to an employee
which is necessary to the operation or is t h e essence of his employer's business.
(3) "Commission" means the Industrial Commission of the state of Utah, and "commissioner"
means a member of that commission.
(4) "Coordinator" or "director" means t h e individual who manages the enforcement of this
chapter.
(5) "Court" means t h e district court in the judicial district of the state of Utah in which t h e
asserted unfair employment practice occurred, or
if this court is not in session at that time, then
any judge of the court.
(6) "Employee" means any person applying
with or employed by an employer.
(7) "Employer" means the state or any political subdivision or board, commission, department, institution, school district, trust, or agent
thereof, and every other person employing 15 or
more employees within the state for each working day in each of 20 calendar weeks or more in
the current or preceding calendar year; b u t it
does not include religious organizations or associations, religious corporations sole, nor any corporation or association constituting a wholly owned
subsidiary or agency of any religious organization or association or religious corporation sole.
(8) "Employment agency" means any person
undertaking to procure employees or opportunities to work for any other person, or t h e holding
itself out to be equipped to do so.
(9) "Handicap" means a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
of a person's major life activities.
(10) "Joint apprenticeship committee" means
any association of representatives of a labor organization and an employer providing, coordinat-
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ing, or controlling an apprentice training program.
(11) "Labor organization" means any organization which exists for the purpose in whole or in
part of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or
protection in connection with employment.
(12) "National origin" means the place of
birth, domicile, or residence of an individual or of
an individual's ancestors.
(13) "On-the-job-training" means any program
designed to instruct a person who, while learning
the particular job for which he is receiving instruction, is also employed at that job, or who
may be employed by the employer conducting the
program during the course of the program, or
when the program is completed.
(14) "Person" means one or more individuals,
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
representatives, trusts or trustees, receivers, the
state of Utah and all political subdivisions and
agencies of the state.
(15) "Presiding officer" means the same as
that term is defined in Section 63-46b-2.
(16) "Prohibited employment practice" means
a practice specified as discriminatory, and therefore unlawful, in Section 34-35-6.
(17) "Retaliate" means the taking of adverse
action by an employer, employment agency,
labor organization, apprenticeship program, onthe-job training program, or vocational school
against one of its employees, applicants, or members because he has opposed any employment
practice prohibited under this chapter of because
he has filed charges, testified, assisted, or participated in any way in any proceeding, investigation, or hearing under this chapter.
(18) "Vocational school" means any school or
institution conducting a course of instruction,
training, or retraining to prepare individuals to
follow an occupation or trade, or to pursue a manual, technical, industrial, business, commercial,
office, personal services, or other nonprofessional
occupations.
1990
4-35-3.

Jurisdiction of Industrial Commission
— Creation of antidiscrimination division — Co-ordinator of fair employment practices.
The commission shall have jurisdiction over the
ubject of employment practices and discrimination
lade unlawful by this chapter. There is hereby creted a division of the commission to be known and
esignated as the Utah Antidiscrimination Division,
rhich division shall be under the jurisdiction and diection of the commission. The division shall have as
ts immediate supervisory head a co-ordinator of fair
mployment practices. Such co-ordinator shall be apointed by the commission. Any co-ordinator so appointed shall at all times be under the direct superviion and control of the commission.
1969
4-35-4.

Antidiscrimination division — Members — Meetings — Quorum.
The antidiscrimination division shall consist of
hree members who shall be members of the commision. The commission may adopt, amend or rescind
ules for governing its meetings, and two commisioners shall constitute a quorum.
1969
t4-35-5. Antidiscrimination division — Powers.
(1) The Utah Antidiscrimination Division may:
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(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators and other employees and agents that it
considers necessary for the enforcement of this
chapter;
(b) adopt, publish, amend, and rescind rules,
consistent with, and for the enforcement of, this
chapter,
(c) receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon
complaints alleging discrimination in employment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job training programs, and vocational schools, or the existence of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice by a person, an employer, an employment agency, a labor organization, or the
employees or members of an employment agency
or labor organization, a joint apprenticeship committee, and vocational school;
(d) investigate and study the existence, character, causes, and extent of discrimination in employment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job
training programs, and vocational schools in this
state by employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, joint apprenticeship committees,
and vocational schools;
(e) formulate plans for the elimination of discrimination by educational or other means;
(f) hold hearings upon complaint made against
a person, an employer, an employment agency, a
labor organization or the employees or members
of an employment agency or labor organization, a
joint apprenticeship committee, or a vocational
school;
(g) issue publications and reports of investigations and research that will tend to promote good
will among the various racial, religious, and ethnic groups of the state, and that will minimize or
eliminate discrimination in employment because
of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age,
or handicap;
(h) prepare and transmit to the governor, at
least once each year, reports describing its proceedings, investigations, hearings it has conducted and the outcome of those hearings, decisions it has rendered, and the other work performed by it;
(i) recommend policies to the governor, and
submit recommendation to employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations to implement those policies;
(j) recommend any legislation concerning discrimination because of race, sex, color, national
origin, religion, age, or handicap to the governor
that it considers necessary;
(k) within the limits of any appropriations
made for its operation, cooperate with other
agencies or organizations, both public and private, in the planning and conducting of educational programs designed to eliminate discriminatory practices prohibited under this chapter;
and
(1) adopt an official seal.
(2) The division shall investigate alleged discriminatory practices involving officers or employees of
state government if requested to do so by the Career
Service Review Board.
(3) (a) In any hearing held under the authority of
this chapter, the division may:
(i) subpoena witnesses and compel their
attendance at the hearing;
(ii) administer oaths and take the testimony of any person under oath; and
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(iii) compel any person to produce for examination any books, papers, or other information relating to the matters raised by the
complaint.
(b) Any of the following may conduct hearings:
(i) the commission;
(ii) any commissioner;
(iii) the coordinator; or
(iv) a hearing examiner or agent appointed by the commission.
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a subpoena issued by the commission, the commission
may petition the district court to enforce the subpoena.
(d) (i) No person may be excused from attending or testifying, or from producing records,
correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by
the commission under the authority of this
section on the ground that the evidence or
the testimony required may tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or
forfeiture.
(ii) No person may be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on
account of any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he shall be compelled to
testify or produce evidence after having
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, except that a person testifying is not
exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury.
1989
34-35-6.

Discriminatory or unfair employment
practices — Permitted practices.
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice:
(a) (i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to discharge, demote, terminate any
person, or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of compensation or in
terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any person otherwise qualified,
because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age,
if the individual is 40 years of age or older,
religion, national origin, or handicap. No applicant nor candidate for any job or position
may be considered "otherwise qualified," unless he possesses the education, training,
ability, moral character, integrity, disposition to work, adherence to reasonable rules
and regulations, and otheT job Telated qualifications required by an employer for any
particular job, job classification, or position
to be filled or created;
(ii) as used in this chapter, "to discriminate in matters of compensation" means the
payment of differing wages or salaries to employees having substantially equal experience, responsibilities, and skill for the particular job. However, nothing in this chapter
prevents increases in pay as a result of longevity with the employer, if the salary increases are uniformly applied and available
.3 all employees on a substantially proportional basis. Nothing in this section prohibits an employer and employee from agreeing to a rate of pay or work schedule designed to protect the employee from loss of
Social Security payment or benefits if the
employee is eligible for those payments;
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(b) for an employment agency:
(i) to refuse to list and properly classify for
employment, or to refuse to refer an individual for employment, in a known available job
for which the individual is otherwise qualified, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions,
religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap;
(ii) to comply with a request from an employer for referral of applicants for employment if the request indicates either directly
or indirectly that the employer discriminates
in employment on account of race, color, sex,
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions, religion, national origin, age, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap;
(c) for a labor organization to exclude any individual otherwise qualified from full membership
rights in the labor organization, or to expel the
individual from membership in the labor organization, or to otherwise discriminate against or
harass any of its members in full employment of
work opportunity, or representation, because of
race, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap;
(d) for any employer, employment agency, or
labor organization to print, or circulate, or cause
to be printed or circulated, any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of
application for employment or membership, or to
make any inquiry in connection with prospective
employment or membership, which expresses, either directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap or
intent to make any such limitation, specification,
or discrimination; unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification, or required by, and
given to, an agency of government for security
reasons;
(e) for any person, whether or not an employer,
an employment agency, a labor organization, or
the employees or members thereof, to aid, incite,
compel, or coerce the doing of a n act defined in
this section to be a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice; or to obstruct or prevent
any peTson from complying \*ith t h i s chapter, or
any order issued under it; or to attempt, either
directly or indirectly, to commit any act prohibited in this section;
(f) for any employer, labor organization, joint
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school,
providing, coordinating, or controlling apprenticeship programs, or providing, coordinating, or
controlling on-the-job-training programs, instruction, training, or retraining programs:
(i) to deny to, or withhold from, any qualified person, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the'
individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap the right to be admitted to, or participate in any apprenticeship training program, on-the-job-training program, or other
occupational instruction, training or retraining program;
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(n) to discriminate against or harass any
qualified person in that person's pursuit of
such programs, or to discriminate against
such a person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of such programs, because of race,
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national
origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of
age or older, or handicap,
(in) to print, or publish, or cause to be
printed or published any notice or advertise
ment relating to employment by the employer, or membership in or any classification or referral for employment by a labor
organization, or relating to any classification
or referral for employment by an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination
based on race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is
40 years of age or older, or handicap except
that a notice or advertisement may indicate
a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or
handicap when religion, race, color, sex, age,
national origin, or handicap is a bona fide
occupational qualification for employment
othmg contained in Subsections (l)(a) through
") shall be construed to prevent the termination of
•loyment of an individual who is physically, menp, or emotionally unable to perform the duties re*ed by that individual's employment, or to prele the variance of insurance premiums, of coveron account of age, or affect any restriction upon
activities of individuals licensed by the liquor aulty with respect to persons under 21 years of age
) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
(l) for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify or refer for employment any individual,
for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment
any individual or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining programs to admit or
employ any individual in any such program,
on the basis of religion, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions,
age, national origin, or handicap m those
certain instances where religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of
age or older, national origin, or handicap is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise,
(n) for a school, college, university, or
other educational institution to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if the
school, college, university, or other educational institution is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or
managed by a particular religious corporation, association, or societv, or if the curriculum of the school college univer<;itv, or
other educational institution is directed to-
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ward the propagation of a particular religion.
(in) for an employer to give preference in
employment to his own spouse son, son-inlaw, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any
person for whom the employer is or would be
liable to furnish financial support if those
persons were unemployed, or for an employer to give preference in employment to
any person to whom the employer during the
preceding six months has furnished more
than one-half of total financial support regardless of whether or not the employer was
or is legally obligated to furnish support, or
for an employer to give preference in employment to any person whose education or training was substantially financed by the employer for a period of two years or more
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter applies
to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of the business or
enterprise under which preferential treatment is
given to any individual because he is a native
American Indian living on or near an Indian reservation
(c) Nothing contained m this chapter shall be
interpreted to require any employer, employment
agency, labor organization, vocational school,
joint labor-management committee, or apprenticeship program subject to this chapter to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex,
age, national origin, or handicap of the individual or group on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion,
sex, age, national origin, or handicap employed
by any employer, referred or classified for employment by an employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified
by any labor organization, or admitted to or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training
program, in comparison with the total number or
percentage of persons of that race, color, religion,
sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any community or county or in the available work force
in any community or county
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice
with respect to age to observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system or any bona fide employment benefit
plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
this chapter except that no such employee benefit
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other
statutory provision to the contrary, other than Subsection (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age
is a bona fide occupational qualification, no person
shall be subject to involuntary termination or retirement from employment on the basis of age alone, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement of an employee who has attained at least 65
years of age, and who, for the two-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide
executive or a high policymaking position, if that employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from his employer's pension,
profit-sharing savings, or deferred compensation
plan or anv combination of those plans which benefit equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000
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34-35-7
34-35-7.
34-35-7.1.

Repealed.

1965

Procedure for aggrieved person to
file claim — Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings — Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination.
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent,
make, sign, and file with the commresion a request for agency action
(b) Every request for agency action shall be
verified under oath or affirmation
(c) A request for agency action made under
this section shall be filed within 180 days after
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse
to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file
with the commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall
promptly assign an investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt impartial investigation
of all allegations made m the request for agency
action
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and
employees shall conduct every investigation in
fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw
the request for agency action, he must do so prior
to the issuance of a final order
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out in the request
for agency action, the investigator shall formally
report these findings to the director
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report,
the director may issue a determination and order
for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding
(c) A party may make a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the director's determination and order
within 30 days of the date of the determination
and order for dismissal
(d) If the director receives no timely request
for a hearing, the determination and order issued
by the director becomes the final order of the
commission
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out in the request
for agency action, the investigator shall formally
report these findings to the director
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report
the director mav issue a determination and order
based on the investigator's report
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(c) A party may file a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the director's determination and order
within 30 days of the date of the determination
and order
(d) If the director receives no timely request
for a hearing, the determination and order issued
by the director requiring the respondent to cease
any discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved
party becomes the final order of the commission
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator
who investigated the matter may not participate m a
hearing except as a witness, nor may he participate
in the deliberations of the presiding officer
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the request for agency action
may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and
the respondent may amend its answer Those amendments may be made during or after a hearing but
only with permission of the presiding officer
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not
engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the request for agency
action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
(b) The presiding officer may order that the
respondent be reimbursed by the complaining
party for his attorneys' fees and costs
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in
a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice,
the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring
the respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to the
complaining party, including reinstatement, back
pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged
and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for
review of the order issued by the presiding officer
in accordance with Section 63-46b-12
(b) If there is no timely request for review the
order issued by the presiding officer becomes the
final order of the commission
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection
(ll)(a) is subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16
(13) The commission shall have authority to make
rules concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admmis
trative Rulemaking Act
(14) The members of the commission and its staff
may not divulge or make public any information
gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation, or proceeding before the commission except in
the following
(a) Information used by the director in making
any determination may be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for
and participation m proceedings before the commission
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the identities of the individuals
or parties are not disclosed
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection
by the attorney general or other legal represents
tives of the state or commission
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(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting requirements of the federal
government.
(15) The procedures contained in this section are
the exclusive remedy under state law for employment
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or handicap.
(16) The commencement of an action under federal
law for relief based upon any act prohibited by this
chapter bars the commencement or continuation of
any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in connection with tlfe same
claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection
is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the
exclusive remedy provision set forth in Subsection
(15).

1991

34-35-8. Repealed.
CHAPTER 36

CHAPTER 38
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING
Section
34-38-1.
34-38-2.
34-38-3.
34-38-4.
34-38-5.
34-38-6.
34-38-7.

34-38-8.
34-38-9.
34-38-10.

TRANSPORTATION OF WORKERS
Section
34-36-1.
34-36-2.
34-36-3.
34-36-4.

Motor vehicles of employers — Safe
maintenance and operation.
Motor vehicles of employers — Rules
and regulations.
Carriers and vehicles of United States
exempt.
Agricultural workers exempt.

34-36-1. Motor vehicles of employers — Safe
maintenance and operation.
Every motor vehicle furnished by an employer to be
used to transport one or more workers to and from
their places of employment shall be maintained in a
safe condition and operated in a safe manner at all
times, whether or not used on a public highway. 1969
34-36-2. Motor vehicles of employers — Rules
and regulations.
The state industrial commission shall make and
enforce reasonable rules and regulations relating to
such motor vehicles used to transport workers to and
from their places of employment. These rules and regulations shall be embodied in a safety code and shall
establish minimum standards.
1969
34-36-3. Carriers and vehicles of United States
exempt.
This chapter shall not apply to motor carriers or to
motor vehicles owned and operated by the United
States.
1969
34-36-4. Agricultural workers exempt.
The provisions of this chapter do not apply to agricultural workers.
1969
CHAPTER 37
DECEPTION DETECTION EXAMINERS
^Renumbered by Laws 1993, ch. 234, §§ 201 to
214.)
34-37-1 to 34-37-16. Renumbered as §S 53-5-301 to
53-5-314.

34-38-2

34-38-11.
34-38-12.
34-38-13.
34-38-14.
34-38-15.

Legislative findings — Purpose and intent of chapter.
Definitions.
Testing for drugs or alcohol.
Samples — Identification and collection.
Time of testing — Cost of testing and
transportation.
Requirements for collection and testing.
Employer's written testing policy —
Purposes and requirements for collection and testing — Employer's use of
test results.
Employer's disciplinary or rehabilitative
actions.
No cause of action arises for failure to
test or detect substance or problem, or
for termination of testing program.
No cause of action arises against employer unless false test result — Presumption and limitation of damages
in claim against employer.
Bases for cause of action for defamation,
libel, slander, or damage to reputation.
No cause of action arises based on failure of employer to establish testing
program.
Confidentiality of information.
Employee not "handicapped."
No physician-patient relationship created.

34-38-1. Legislative findings — Purpose and intent of chapter.
The Legislature finds that a healthy and productive work force, safe working conditions free from the
effects of drugs and ^alcohol, and maintenance of the
quality of products produced and services rendered in
this state, are important to employers, employees,
and the general public. The Legislature further finds
that the abuse of drugs and alcohol creates a variety
of workplace problems, including increased injuries
on the job, increased absenteeism, increased financial
burden on health and benefit programs, increased
workplace theft, decreased employee morale, decreased productivity, and a decline in the quality of
products and services.
Therefore, in balancing the interests of employers,
employees, and the welfare of the general public, the
Legislature finds that fair and equitable testing for
drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance
with this chapter, is in the best interest of all parties.
The Legislature does not intend to prohibit any employee from seeking damages or job reinstatement, if
action was taken by his employer based on a false
drug or alcohol test result.
1987
34-38-2. Definitions.
For purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Alcohol" means ethyl alcohol or ethanol.
(2) "Drugs" means any substance recognized
as a drug in the United States Pharmacopoeia,
the National Formulary, the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia, or other drug compendia, or supplement to any of those compendia
(3) "Employer" means any person, firm, or corporation, including any public utility or transit
district, which has one or more workers or opera-
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j^ons known to have a direct interest in the re^ ^ted agency action as specified in Section
^U6b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party
A the respondent/employer.
? CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR
Pi-RPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEpCBES ACT
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1UM5), U.C.A., are
n informal process with no hearing and are gov*iTTied by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement
inferences scheduled pursuant to Section
u-35-7 K3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings.
G PRESIDING OFFICER
for those procedures specified in Section
14-35-7-K1H5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be
:he Director or the Director's designee. The presiding
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section
34-35-7.H6M11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the
Commission.
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making
and Review.
The following rules pertain to the procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1, U.C.A.
A For purposes of requesting review of the initial
Determination and Order, the following provisions
and those of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A., shall apply:
1 The initial Determination and Order of the Division, after the completion of an investigation on a
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the Director The Director may request that the Commission's
legal staff review an investigatory file and make a
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance
of the initial Determination and Order. The Director
may refer a request for agency action back to an in\estigator for further investigation when necessary.
2 Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4.A.1
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final
Commission Orders until either the time to file a
written request to the Director for an evidentiary
heanng to review de novo the Director's Determination and Order has expired or until the Order is affirmed in a Commission Order on review per Section
63-46b-12, U.C.A.
3 A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30
days of the date of the initial Determination and Order
4 A request for an evidentiary hearing must state
a reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed
differently. In most cases, the need to cross-examine
the individuals who have submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of the
Commission will be considered a valid reason for
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission.
5 Either party may file a written request for review of the presiding officer's Order in accordance
*»th Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A.
B. Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimination, whether risk of future injury or increased cost
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of
l
he Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case
hasis subject to the following limitations:
1 The respondent/employer seeking to use the defense of risk of future injury must provide reliable
Medical evidence showing a causal connection be-

tween the increased risk of future injury and the
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk.
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the defense of increased cost of insurance premium must
show with verified documentary evidence that a significant insurance premium increase would occur if
the charging party were hired or remained in the
position at issue.
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on
federal case law regarding discrimination in interpreting the Act in cases where the federal law being
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and
where state law interpretation is non-existent.
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Purpose of Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section
34-35-7.K6H10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative
hearing which shall occur following the investigation
process referred to in Section 34-35-7.K1M5), U.C.A.
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the requirements imposed by Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A.
R560-1-6. Declaratory Orders.
A. PURPOSE
As required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule provides the procedures for submission, review, and disposition of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on
the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders governing or issued by the agency.
B. PETITION FORM AND FILING
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to
the Director, who shall mark the petition with the
date of receipt.
2. The petition shall:
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency
Declaratory Order;
(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be reviewed;
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances
in which applicability is to be reviewed;
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability
review, addressing in particular why the review
should not be considered frivolous;
(e) include an address and telephone where the petitioner can be contacted during regular work days;
(f) declare whether the petitioner has participated
in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding
concerning the same issue within the past 12 months;
and
(g) be signed by the petitioner.
C. REVIEWABILITY
The agency shall not review a petition for a Declaratory Order that is:
1. not within the jurisdiction and competence of the
agency;
2. trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial; or
3. otherwise excluded by state or federal law.
D. PETITION REVIEW AND DISPOSITION
1. The Director shall promptly review and consider
the petition and may:
(a) meet with the petitioner;
(b) consult with Legal Counsel; or
(c) take any action consistent with law that the
agency deems necessary to provide the petition adequate review and due consideration.
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dv) a copy of the rule or proposed rule, if
any,
(v) an allegation t h a t he h a s either ex
hausted the administrative remedies by complying with Section 63-46a-12 or met t h e requirements for waiver of exhaustion of administrative remedies established by Subsection (2)(b),
(vi) t h e relief sought, and
(vn) factual and legal allegations supporting t h e relief sought
(b) (1) The plaintiff shall serve a summons and
a copy of the complaint as required by t h e
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(n) The defendants shall file a responsive
pleading as required by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedures
(in) The agency shall file the administrative record of the rule, if any, with its responsive pleading
(4) The district court may grant relief to t h e petitioner by
(a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds
that
(I) the rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not have legal
authority to make the rule,
(II) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of t h e
whole administrative record, or
(in) the agency did not follow proper rulemaking procedure,
(b) declaring the rule nonapphcable to t h e petitioner,
(c) remanding t h e matter to the aeency for
compliance with proper rulemaking procedures
or further fact-finding,
(d) ordering t h e agency to comply with Section
63-46a-3,
(e) issuing a judicial stay or injunction to enjoin the agency from illegal action or action t h a t
would cause irreparable h a r m to the petitioner,
or
(f) any combination of Subsections (a) through
(e)
(5) If the plaintiff meets the requirements of Subsection (2Kb) the district court may review and act on
a complaint under this section whether or not t h e
plaintiff has requested t h e agency review under Sec
tion 63-46a-12
1990
63-46a-13. Repealed.

1990

63-46a-14. Time for contesting a rule.
A proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of
noncompliance with the procedural requirements of
this chapter shall commence within two years of the
effective date of the rule.
1965
63-46a-15. Repealed.

1988

63-46a-16. Utah Administrative Code as official
compilation of rules — Judicial notice.
The code shall be received by all the judges, public
officers, commissions, and departments of the state
government as evidence of the administrative law of
the state of Utah and as an authorized compilation of
the administrative law of Utah All courts shall take
judicial notice of the code and its provisions
1992

63-46b-l

CHAPTER 46b
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Section
63-46b 0 5
63-46b 1
63-46b-2
63-46b-3
63-46b-4
63-46b-5
63-46b-6
63-46b-7
63-46b-8
63-46b-9
63-46b-10
63-46b-ll
63-46b-12
63-46b-13
63-46b-14
63-46b-15
63-46b-16
63-46b-17
63-46b-18
63-46b-19
63-46b-20
63-46b-21
63-46b-22

Short title
Scope and applicability of chapter
Definitions
Commencement of adjudicatne proceedings
Designation of adjudicative proceedings as formal or informal
Procedures for informal adjudicative
proceedings
Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Responsive pleadings
Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Discovery and subpoenas
Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Hearing procedure
Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Intervention
Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Orders
Default
Agency review — Procedure
Agency review — Reconsideration
Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings
Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings
Judicial review — Type of relief
Judicial review — Stay and other temporary remedies pending final disposition
Civil enforcement
Emergency adjudicative proceedings
Declaratory orders
Transition procedures

63-46b-0.5. Short title.
This act is known as the "Administrative Procedures Act "
1991
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter.
(1) Except a s set forth in Subsection (2), and except
as otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, t h e provisions of this chapter apply to every
agency of t h e state of Utah and govern
(a) all state agency actions that determine the
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or
other legal interests of one or more identifiable
persons, including all agency actions to grant,
deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw,
or amend an authority, right, or license, and
(b) judicial review of all such actions
(2) This chapter does not govern
(a) the procedures for promulgation of agency
rules, or the judicial review of those procedures
or rules,
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in
the payment of a tax, the decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, t h e imposition of, a n d
penalties or interest on, taxes, or the issuance of
any tax assessment, except t h a t this chapter governs any agency action commenced by a taxpayer
or by another person authorized by law to contest
the validity or correctness of those actions,
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(c) state agency actions relating to extradition,
to the granting of pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the rescission, termination, or revocation of parole or
probation, to actions and decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge, conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the discipline of,
resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the Utah State
Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center,
or persons in the custody or jurisdiction of the
Division of Mental Health, or persons on probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions;
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline,
employ, transfer, reassign, or promote students
or teachers in any school or educational institution, or judicial review of those actions;
(e) applications for employment and internal
personnel actions within an agency concerning
its own employees, or judicial review of those actions;
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment
under Title 35, Chapter 9, Utah Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1973, and Title 58,
Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing
Act, except that this chapter governs any agency
action commenced by the employer, licensee, or
other person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of such a citation or assessment;
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state funds, the management and disposal of school and institutional trust land assets,
except that this chapter governs any agency's
final action commenced by any person pursuant
to Section 65A-1-7, and contracts for the purchase or sale of products, real property, supplies,
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for
an agency of the state, except as provided in such
contracts, or judicial review of those actions;
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter
1, Article 3, Powers and Duties of Commissioner
of Financial Institutions, and Title 7, Chapter 2,
Possession of Depository Institution by Commissioner, Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah Industrial Loan
Corporation Guaranty Act, Title 7, Chapter 19,
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or
Holding Companies, and Title 63, Chapter 30,
Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review
of those actions;
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemployment benefits, the initial
determination of any person's eligibility for benefits under Title 35, Chapter 1. Worker's Compensation, and Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, or the initial determination of a person's unemployment tax liability;
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of monetary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, development, or the arts, or judicial review of those
actions;
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or
order under Title 26, Chapter 8, Utah Emergency
Medical Services System Act. Title 19, Chapter 5,
Water Quality Act, Title 19. Chapter 4, Safe
Drinking Water Act, Title 19. Chapter 2, Air
Conservation Act, or Title 19. Chapter 6, Part 1,
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, except that this
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chapter governs any agency action commenced
by any person authorized by law to contest the
validity or correctness of any such notice or order;
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required
by federal statute or regulation to be conducted
according to federal procedures;
(m) the initial determination of any person's
eligibility for government or public assistance
benefits;
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and certificates of registration;
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603.
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies
otherwise available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action; or
(b) challenge an agency's rule.
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior
to the beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the
presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding
from:
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with
parties and interested persons to:
(i) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(iii) simplify the evidence;
(iv) facilitate discovery; or
(v) expedite the proceedings; or
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment if the requirements of Rule
12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party,
except to the extent that the requirements of
those rules are modified by this chapter.
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not governed by this chapter,
except as explicitly provided in that section.
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings
authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are governed by
this chapter.
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from
enacting rules affecting or governing adjudicative
proceedings or from following any of those rules, if
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the requirements of this chapter.
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any provision of this chapter
would result in the denial of funds or services to
an agency of the state from the federal government, the applicability of those provisions to that
agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the denial.
(b) The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature at its next session.
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
provide an independent basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action.
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown,
from lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial review.
1993
63-46b-2. Definitions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
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(a) "Adjudicative
proceeding" means
an
agency action or proceeding described in Section
63-46b-l.
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, department, division, officer, council, office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of
this state, including the agency head, agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or
under the authority of the agency head, but does
not mean the Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political subdivision of the state, or any
administrative unit of a political subdivision of
the state.
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body
of individuals in whom the ultimate legal authority of the agency is vested by statute.
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceeding authorized and governed by Section
63-46b-21.
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certification, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by statute.
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation, association,
political subdivision or its units, governmental
subdivision or its units, public or private organization or entity of any character, or another
agency.
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency
head, or an individual or body of individuals
designated by the agency head, by the
agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an
adjudicative proceeding.
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an agency may substitute one presiding officer for another during any proceeding.
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one phase of a proceeding need not
continue as presiding officer through all
phases of a proceeding.
(i) "Respondent" means a person against
whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated,
whether by an agency or any other person.
Cj) "Superior agency" means an agency required or authorized by law to review the orders
of another agency.
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from
designating by rule the names or titles of the agency
head or the presiding officers with responsibility for
adjudicative proceedings before the agency.
1988
63-46b-3.

Commencement of adjudicative proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section
63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings shall be commenced by either:
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are
commenced by the agency; or
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings
are commenced by persons other than the
agency.
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and
served according to the following requirements:
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(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding officer, and shall include:
(i) the names and mailing addresses of ail
persons to whom notice is being given by the
presiding officer, and the name, title, and
mailing address of any attorney or employee
who has been designated to appear for the
agency;
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed;
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted informally
according to the provisions of rules adopted
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the provisions of Sections
63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be
formal, a statement that each respondent
must file a written response within 30 days
of the mailing date of the notice of agency
action;
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be
formal, or if a hearing is required by statute
or rule, a statement of the time and place of
any scheduled hearing, a statement of the
purpose for which the hearing is to be held,
and a statement t h a t a party who fails to
attend or participate in the hearing may be
held in default;
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
be informal and a hearing is required by
statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted
by rule and may be requested by a party
within the time prescribed by rule, a statement that the parties may request a hearing
within the time provided by the agency's
rules;
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which the adjudicative
proceeding is to be maintained;
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and
telephone number of the presiding officer;
and
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, to the extent known
by the presiding officer, the questions to be
decided.
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the agency shall:
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each
party;
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if
required by statute; and
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to
any other person who has a right to notice
under statute or rule.
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than the agency to initiate
adjudicative proceedings, that person's request
for agency action shall be in writing and signed
by the person invoking the jurisdiction of the
agency, or by his representative, and shall include:
(i) the names and addresses of all persons
to whom a copy of the request for agency
action is being sent;
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(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known;
(iii) the date that the request for agency
action was mailed;
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which agency action is requested;
(v) a statement of the relief or action
sought from the agency; and
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons
forming the basis for relief or agency action.
(b) The person requesting agency action shall
file the request with the agency and shall send a
copy by mail to each person known to have a
direct interest in the requested agency action.
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or
more printed forms eliciting the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for agency action when completed and filed
by the person requesting agency action.
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review
a request for agency action and shall:
(i) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is granted and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed;
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is denied and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that
the party may request a hearing before the
agency to challenge the denial; or
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine
the agency's response to the request.
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection
(3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Subsection
(3)(d)(ii) of this section.
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d) to all parties, except that any notice required by Subsection
(3)(d)(iii) may be published when publication
is required by statute. •
(iii) The notice required by Subsection
(3)(d)(iii) shall:
(A) give the agency's file number or
other reference number;
(B) give the name of the proceeding;
(C) designate whether the proceeding
is one of a category to be conducted informally according to the provisions of
rules enacted under Sections 63-46b-4
and 63-46b-5, with citation to the applicable rule authorizing that designation,
or formally according to the provisions
of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where respondent
parties are known, state that a written
response must be filed within 30 days of
the date of the agency's notice if mailed,
or within 30 days of the last publication
date of the agency's notice, if published;
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in
an informal adjudicative proceeding,
state the time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which the
hearing is to be held, and that a party
who fails to attend or participate in a
scheduled and noticed hearing may be
held in default;
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(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
be informal, and a hearing is required
by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested by
a party within the time prescribed by
rule, state the parties' right to request a
hearing and the time within which a
hearing may be requested under the
agency's rules; and
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding officer.
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions
are not governed by this chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or actions
are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency action seeking review must be filed
with the agency within the time prescribed by the
agency's rules.
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by rule, provide for a longer
response time than allowed by this section, and may
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable federal law.
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or
order, applications for licenses filed under authority
of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not considered
to be a request for agency action under this chapter.
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is
to award a license or other privilege as to which there
are multiple competing applicants, the agency may,
by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the award of that license or
privilege.
1968
63-46b-4.

Designation of adjudicative proceedi n g s as formal or informal.
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories
of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this chapter if:
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not
violate any procedural requirement imposed by a
statute other than this chapter;
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the
parties to the proceedings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures;
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will be enhanced by categorizations; and
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings
outweighs the potential benefits to the public of a
formal adjudicative proceeding.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all
agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules
shall be conducted formally in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter.
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any
adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer may
convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.
1987
63-46b-5.

Procedures for informal adjudicative
proceedings.
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or
more categories of adjudicative proceedings as infor-
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mal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative
proceedings that include the following:
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and
requires a response, no answer or other pleading
responsive to the allegations contained in the notice of agency action or the request for agency
action need be filed.
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing
is permitted by rule and is requested by a party
within the time prescribed by rule.
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the
notice of agency action or in the request for
agency action shall be permitted to testify,
present evidence, and comment on the issues.
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties.
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency
may issue subpoenas or other orders to compel
production of necessary evidence.
(f) AH parties shall have access to information
contained in the agency's files and to all materials and information gathered in any investigation, to the extent permitted by law.
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the
agency may enact rules permitting intervention
where a federal statute or rule requires that a
state permit intervention.
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties,
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of
an informal adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing
that states the following:
(i) the decision;
(ii) the reasons for the decision;
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative
or judicial review available to the parties;
and
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or
requesting a review,
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based
on the facts appearing in the agency's files and
on the facts presented in evidence at any hearings.
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall
be promptly mailed to each of the parties.
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing.
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a
reporter approved by the agency prepare a transcript from the agency's record of the hearing.
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes
any investigative right or power given to an agency
by another statute.
1988
63-46b~6.

Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Responsive pleadings.
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless
modified by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5),
the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written
response signed by the respondent or his representative within 30 days of the mailing date or last date of
publication of the notice of agency action or the notice
under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference
number;
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks;
(d) a statement of the facts; and
le) a statement summarizing the reasons that
the relief requested should be granted.
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(2) The response shall be filed with the agency and
one copy shall be sent by mail to each party.
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule,
may permit or require pleadings in addition to the
notice of agency action, the request for agency action,
and the response. All papers permitted or required to
be filed shall be filed with the agency and one copy
shall be sent by mail to each party.
1988
63-46b-7.

Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Discovery and subpoenas.
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency
may, by rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate
to permit the parties to obtain all relevant information necessary to support their claims or defenses. If
the agency does not enact rules under this section,
the parties may conduct discovery according to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence in
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the
presiding officer when requested by any party, or
may be issued by the presiding officer on his own
motion.
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes
any investigative right or power given to an agency
by another statute.
1987
63-46b-8.

Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i)
and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, "a
hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a
party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in
the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts
that could be judicially noticed under the
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of
other proceedings before the agency, and of
technical or scientific facts within the
agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the
agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a
person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions
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that the agency is permitted by statute to impose
to protect confidential information disclosed at
the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to
preserve the integrity of the hearing.
1988

63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Intervention.
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to
intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each
party. The petition shall include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference
number;
(b) the name of the proceeding;
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the
petitioner's legal rights or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision of law; and
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner
seeks from the agency.
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for
intervention if h e determines t h a t :
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the formal adjudicative
proceeding; and
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings
will not be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention.
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to
intervene shall be in writing and sent by mail to
the petitioner and each party.
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the intervener's participation
in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary
for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after the intervention.
1987
63-46b-10.

Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the
time required by any applicable statute or rule of
the agency, t h e presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's
conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by
the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative
or judicial review of the order available to
aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
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(2) T h e presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings
on a portion of the issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
1988

63-46b-ll.

Default.

(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the adjudicative
proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response under Section
63-46b-6.

(2) An order of default shall include a statement of
the grounds for default and shall be mailed to all
parties.
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the
agency set aside the default order, and any order
in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent
to the default order, by following the procedures
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding
officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review
under Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the
default.
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun
by a party that has other parties besides the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after
issuing the order of default, conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the
party in default and shall determine all issues in
the adjudicative proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party.
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no
parties other than the agency and the party in
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 1988
63-46b-12. A g e n c y review — Procedure.
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency,
the aggrieved party may file a written request
for review within 30 days after the issuance of
the order with the person or entity designated for
t h a t purpose by the statute or rule,
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the
relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was
mailed; and

703

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

63-46b-15

(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
and to each party.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of t h e request for review, or within t h e time period provided final agency action, except in actions where judicial
by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may review is expressly prohibited by statute.
file a response with the person designated by statute
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exor rule to receive the response. One copy of t h e re- hausting all administrative remedies available, exsponse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and cept that:
to t h e presiding officer.
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
agency or superior agency shall review t h e order
required;
within a reasonable time or within t h e time required
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judiby statute or t h e agency's rules.
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or
(4) To assist in review, t h e agency or superior
all administrative remedies if:
agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file
(i) t h e administrative remedies are inadebriefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
quate; or
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
all parties.
irreparable h a r m disproportionate to t h e
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of
public benefit derived from requiring exany response, other filings, or oral argument, or
haustion.
within the time required by statute or applicable
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial rerules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
view of final agency action within 30 days after
written order on review.
the date that the order constituting the final
(b) The order on review shall be signed by t h e
agency action is issued or is considered to have
agency head or by a person designated by t h e
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
each party.
other appropriate parties as respondents and
(c) The order on review shall contain:
shall meet the form requirements specified in
(i) a designation of the statute or rule perthis chapter.
1988
mitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of t h e issues reviewed;
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues
cative proceedings.
reviewed;
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of t h e
review by trial de novo all final agency actions
issues reviewed;
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed(v) t h e reasons for t h e disposition;
ings, except t h a t t h e juvenile court shall have
(vi) whether t h e decision of the presiding
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
to removal or placement decisions regarding chilor modified, and whether all or any portion
dren in state custody.
of t h e adjudicative proceeding is to be re(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjumanded;
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in t h e
(vii) a notice of a n y right of further adstatute governing the agency or, in t h e absence
ministrative reconsideration or judicial reof such a venue provision, in the county where
view available to aggrieved parties; and
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
(viii) the time limits applicable to any applace of business.
peal or review.
1988
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
63-46b-13. A g e n c y review — Reconsideration.
governed by t h e U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order
and shall include:
is issued for which review by t h e agency or by a
(i) the name and mailing address of t h e
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unparty seeking judicial review;
available, and if the order would otherwise con(ii) t h e n a m e and mailing address of t h e
stitute final agency action, any party may file a
respondent agency;
written request for reconsideration with t h e
(iii) t h e title and date of the final agency
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which
action to be reviewed, together with a duplirelief is requested.
cate copy, summary, or brief description of
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the
the agency action;
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek(iv) identification of the persons who were
ing judicial review of t h e order.
parties in t h e informal adjudicative proceed(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed
ings that led to the agency action;
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
each party by t h e person making t h e request.
the informal proceeding;
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for
(vi) facts demonstrating t h a t t h e party
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting
.seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
the request or denying t h e request.
judicial review;
(b) If the agency head or the person designated
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20
type and extent of relief requested;
days after the filing of the request, t h e request
(viii) a statement of the reasons why t h e
for reconsideration shall be considered to be depetitioner is entitled to relief.
nied.
1&88
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(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section.
1990

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988
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63-46b-17. Judicial r e v i e w — T y p e of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
1987
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that:
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is
likely to prevail on the merits when the
court finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will
suffer irreparable injury without immediate
relief;
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking
review will not substantially harm other
parties to the proceedings; and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety,
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action under the circumstances.
1987
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement.
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order
by seeking civil enforcement in the district
courts.
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an
agency's order must name, as defendants, each
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks
to obtain civil enforcement.
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order shall be determined by
the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) The action may request, and the court may
grant, any of the following:
(i) declaratory relief;
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(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive relief;
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by
law; or
(iv) any combination of the foregoing.
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly impaired or threatened by the failure of an agency
to enforce an agency's order may timely file a
complaint seeking civil enforcement of that order, but the action may not be commenced:
(1) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff
has given notice of his intent to seek civil
enforcement of the alleged violation to the
agency head, the attorney general, and to
each alleged violator against whom the petitioner seeks civil enforcement;
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently
prosecuting a complaint seeking civil enforcement of the same order against the
same or a similarly situated defendant; or
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the
same order has been filed and is pending in
court.
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of
an agency's order must name, as defendants, the
agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the
agency that is vested with the power to enforce
the order, and each alleged violator against
whom the plaintiff seeks civil enforcement.
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized
by statute, a complaint seeking civil enforcement
of an agency's order may not request, and the
court may not grant, any monetary payment
apart from taxable costs.
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an
agency's order, in addition to any other defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground
that:
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued
by an agency without jurisdiction to issue the
order;
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant;
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or
(d) the defendant violated the order but has
subsequently complied.
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order are reviewable in the same
manner as other civil cases.
1987
63-46b-20.

Emergency adjudicative proceedings.
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency
basis without complying with the requirements of
this chapter if:
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented
to the agency show that an immediate and significant danger to the public health, safety, or welfare exists; and
(b) the threat requires immediate action by
the agency.
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency
shall:
(a) limit its order to require only the action
necessary to prevent or avoid the danger to the
public health, safety, or welfare;
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective
immediately, that includes a brief statement of
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons
for the agency's utilization of emergency adjudicative proceedings; and
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who
are required to comply with the order.

63-46b-21

(3) If the emergency order issued under this section
will result in the continued infringement or impairment of any legal right or interest of any party, the
agency shall commence a formal adjudicative proceeding in accordance with the other provisions of
this chapter.
1987
63-46b-21. Declaratory orders.
(1) Any person may file a request for agency action, requesting that the agency issue a declaratory
order determining the applicability of a statute, rule,
or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency
to specified circumstances.
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that:
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of
petitions for declaratory orders;
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions;
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which
the agency will not issue a declaratory order;
(d) are consistent with the public interest and
with the general policy of this chapter, and
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of
reliable advice.
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory order if:
(i) the request is one of a class of circumstances that the agency has by rule defined
as being exempt from declaratory orders; or
(ii) the person requesting the declaratory
order participated in an adjudicative proceeding concerning the same issue within 12
months of the date of the present request,
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order
that would substantially prejudice the rights of a
person who would be a necessary party, only if
that person consents in writing to the determination of the matter by a declaratory proceeding.
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceedings if:
(a) they meet the requirements of Section
63-46b-9; and
(b) they file timely petitions for intervention
according to agency rules.
(5) An agency may provide, by rule or order, that
other provisions of Sections 63-46b-4 through 63-46b13 apply to declaratory proceedings.
(6) (a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory
order, the agency may issue a written order:
(i) declaring the applicability of the statute, rule, or order in question to the specified
circumstances;
(ii) setting the matter for adjudicative proceedings;
(iii) agreeing to issue a declaratory order
within a specified time; or
(iv) declining to issue a declaratory order
and stating the reasons for its action.
(b) A declaratory order shall contain:
(i) the names of all parties to the proceeding on which it is based;
(ii) the particular facts on which it is
based; and
(iii) the reasons for its conclusion.
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to a
request for a declaratory proceeding shall be
mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other
parties.
(d) A declaratory order has the same status
and binding effect as any other order issued in an
adjudicative proceeding.
(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in
writing to an extension, if an agency has not issued a

63-46b-22

declaratory order within 60 days after receipt of the
petition for a declaratory order, the petition is denied.
1988

63-46b-22. Transition procedures.
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review contained in this chapter
are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings
commenced by or before an agency on or after January 1, 1988.
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action,
agency review, and judicial review that are in effect
on December 31,1987, govern all agency adjudicative
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or
before December 31, 1987, even if those proceedings
are still pending before an agency or a court on January 1,1988.
1991
CHAPTER 47
COMMISSION FOR WOMEN A N D FAMILIES
Section
63-47-1.
63-47-2.
63-47-3.
63-47-4.
63-47-5.
63-47-6.
63-47-7.
63-47-8.
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63-47-1. Creation — Purpose.
There is hereby established the governor's Commission for Women and Families. The purpose of the
commission shall be to advise and confer with the
governor and state agencies concerning issues of importance to women and families in Utah and to serve
as a contact and coordinating group to analyze state
and local programs to determine whether they adequately serve women and protect the rights of men,
women, and families.
1990
63-47-2.

M e m b e r s — Appointment — Terms —
Vacancies.
The commission shall consist of 19 members to be
appointed by the governor for terms of four years.
Current members continue to serve until the expiration of their terms. The governor shall appoint the
additional four members to serve for four years. Subsequent appointments shall be for terms of four years.
Vacancies shaU be filled for the balance of the unexpired term. Members may serve two consecutive appointments.
1990

63-47-5. Duties.
The commission shall take action to carry out the
following duties:
(1) confer with and advise the governor and
heads of various state departments regarding
discriminatory legislation and practices, and the
planning of programs of particular concern to
women and families;
(2) serve as a clearinghouse for coordination
and evaluation of programs, services, and legislation affecting women and families;
(3) receive and refer complaints concerning alleged violation of women's rights and responsibilities and if necessary report such action to the
governor;
(4) conduct studies, workshops, or fact-finding
hearings to develop recommendations for constructive action in all areas of interest to women
and families;
(5) conduct or participate in educational programs concerning issues of importance to women
and families;
(6) encourage community organizations and
state and local units of government to institute
activities designed to meet the needs of women
and families;
(7) participate in gaining support of changes
deemed necessary by developing legislation and
community education; and
(8) act as a liaison between the governor and
national advisory organizations on the status of
women or families, and represent t h e governor
and t h e state at meetings of such national organizations.
1990
63-47-6. Authority to hire staff.
The commission shall recommend to the governor
qualified individuals to staffthe commission based on
available funds in the commission budget and in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 19, Utah State Personnel Management Act.
1992
63-47-7.

Authority to accept funds, gifts, and
donations.
The commission may receive and accept federal
funds, private gifts, donations or funds from any
source. All moneys shall be deposited with the state
and shall be continuously available to the commission to carry out the purposes of this act.
1973
63-47-8. Enactment of b y l a w s and rules.
The commission may enact bylaws or other rules
for its own governance.
1973
CHAPTER 48
INDEMNIFICATION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES

63-47-3. Qualifications of members.
Not more than ten members of the commission may
be from one political party. Members shall be appointed from persons with a demonstrated record of
leadership and involvement, and a willingness to
make a commitment to the furtherance of the purposes of the commission. The commission shall make
recommendations to the governor concerning appointment of members.
1990

63-48-1 to 63-48-7.

63-47-4. Election of chairman — Meetings.
Commission members shall elect a chairman, and
may appoint such other officers from its membership
as is deemed necessary. The commission shall meet in
regular meetings and may meet at special meetings
at the request of the chairman or the governor. 1973

Section
63-49-1.
63-49-2.
63-49-3.
63-49-4.

(Repealed b y L a w s 1983, c h . 131, § 10.)
Repealed.

CHAPTER 49
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Short title.
Definition of terms.
Purpose of chapter.
Creation of Utah Department of
Transportation
—
Functions,

state 01 utan

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LABOR / ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
John A. Medina
Director

Mailing Address:
Industrial Commission of Utah
Labor Division
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6630
FAX #: (801) 530-7609

Street Address:
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 530-6801

STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECHT
COMPLAINANT,
vs.
KENNECOTT CORP,, a Delaware
Corporation, licensed to do
business in the State of Utah
RESPONDENT.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman
Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Dixie L. Minson
Commissioner

UADD NO. 92-0393
EEOC NO. 35C-92-0418

D E T E R M I N A T I O N
JURISDICTION
Under the authority vested in me by the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act, of 1965, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, as amended, I issue on behalf of this Division, the
following Determination as to the merits of the subject charge.
The jurisdictional requirements have been met as required by the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, the Utah
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended.
SUMMARY OF CHARGE
On May 6, 1992, Stephen E. Hausknecht, hereinafter Charging Party,
alleged that Kennecott Corp., hereinafter Respondent, discriminated
against him based upon his age.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE
The Respondent categorically denies that Charging
subjected to discrimination as a result of his age.

Party was

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION
A.

Charging Party's Allegations

Charging Party asserts that he has been illegally discriminated
against based upon his age, over 40.

Exhibit^

Charging Party asserts that not having any training regarding
sexual harassment or what constitutes sexual harassment, and
without any previous warnings, and having 38 years service with the
Respondent, he was terminated because he was told he was guilty of
sexual harassment.
Charging Party asserts that he is aware of a male employee, under
the age of 40, who was charged with sexual harassment, who has not
been terminated, and is still employed by the Respondent.
Charging Party asserts that less than one month before Charging
Party was terminated, he received a satisfactory job performance
review and a $2,300.00 raise.
Charging Party asserts that he never received any training from
Respondent regarding what constitutes sexual harassment. Charging
Party further asserts that at no time was any complaint ever made
against him, nor did he receive any warnings prior to the time he
was called in and terminated. Charging Party asserts that at no
time was there any physical threats or physical overtures.
Charging Party asserts that the boundaries of sexual harassment is
not clear cut, and to a large extent reflects changing morays and
values of our society.
Charging Party asserts that in regard to the allegation that he
improperly disposed of Respondent/s property, Charging Party never
received a formal reprimand, and he was assigned to dispose of such
property.
Charging Party asserts that in regard to the alleged
unauthorized vacations, such were raised for the first time in
Respondent's reply letter. Charging Party further asserts that he
always advised Respondent when he was leaving or planning on taking
vacation.
Charging Party asserts that he apologized to his fellow employees
regarding the water incident. Charging Party further asserts that
he did take away certain extra medical supplies which had been
stock piled. However, it is asserted that the employees were left
with adequate supplies, and Charging Party had gotten approval from
Mr. Dunford to remove such excess at least three days earlier.
Charging Party admits that he went with a female employee to look
at a desk, and told her in a joking manner, "this ought to deserve
a kiss, but it might constitute or be considered sexual
harassment." Charging Party admits that on a few occasions he did
place his arm on the shoulder of a female employee. However,
Charging Party asserts that he was never told that this was
improper no did any of the female employees ever tell him to stop.
Charging Party asserts that in order to constitute sexual
harassment, such behavior must be unwanted, but without any
training warnings or complaints, there is no way of knowing if
Charging Party's behavior was unwanted.

B.

Respondent's Answer to Charging Party's Allegations:

Respondent contends that Charging Party's age had no impact on
Respondent's decision to terminate his employment as a result of
his pervasive and objectionable conduct towards Respondent's female
employees, and his unsatisfactory performance.
Respondent contends that it was advised that Charging Party may
have engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment. Respondent
further contends that after it conducted a complete and through
investigation, Respondent determined that in fact Charging Party
had engaged in conduct which was in violation of Respondent's
sexual harassment policy.
Such harassment, it is contended,
included: (1) When Charging Party went with a female employee to
look at a desk in an isolated part of the building in which they
worked, Charging Party backed her into a corner and requested a
kiss in exchange for a desk. Charging Party stated lfI guess I
can't do this or it would be called sexual harassment."; (2)
Charging Party treating female employees differently regarding
assistance, supplies and parking, depending on whether or not they
had been nice to the Charging Party; (3) Some females co-workers
stated that Charging Party had actually hugged or kissed or
attempted to hug and kiss female employees in the building they
worked at; (4) Charging Party would occasionally suggest that he
ought to receive a hug or a kiss before giving out supplies, and in
some instances female employees would go together to obtain
supplies from Charging Party, since they were uncomfortable in
approaching him alone.
Respondent contends that Charging Party was not subject to
disparate treatment. Respondent points out that in early 1991,
Respondent terminated the employment of a janitor, who was under
the age of 40, for unsatisfactory performance and for having
engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment, including making
advances to other female employees, and cornering a female employee
in isolated area to ask for a kiss. Furthermore, it is asserted
that there were also elements in such employee's record considered
too harmful to place him in any other position.
Respondent also points out that in November of 1991, a Building
Services Technician, under the age of 40, engaged in conduct
described as sexual harassment, in that he on several occasions
approached one of the female employees whom he supervised, engaged
in banter of a sexual nature with her, and asked for dates with
her. Such employee was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a
janitor, received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so as
to avoid contact with female employees.
Respondent contends that Charging Party's lack of specific training
regarding sexual harassment, lack of prior warnings or complaints,
and his years of service with Respondent are irrelevant to the
issue of whether or not he was terminated because of his age.
Respondent contends that Charging Party admitted having seen and
read Respondent's sexual harassment policy posted on the bulletin

boards at the Technical Center where he worked. Respondent further
points out that during one incident when Charging Party backed a
female employee into a corner in an isolated part of the building
in which he worked and requested a kiss in exchange for obtaining
a desk, Charging Party stated "I guess I can't do this or it would
be called sexual harassment."
Respondent contends that Charging Party held the position of
Supervisor Maintenance Services within Security and Administration
at the time of his discharge. Respondent contends that in 1989,
Charging Party had been reprimanded for disposing of Respondent's
property without authorization. Respondent contends that in June
of 1991, Charging Party was the subject of an internal review
relating to his work habits, particularly, Charging Party taking a
vacation without advising Respondent that he would do so.
Respondent further asserts, that at the same time, Charging Party
allowed a summer intern to leave, thus leaving the building without
security or coverage for services.
It is contended that on March 18, 1992, Respondent received a
telephone call from an employee at the Technical Center indicating
that the water to the building had been turned off without notice,
thus significantly inconveniencing the other employees in the
building. Respondent located Charging Party and pointed out to him
that he should have advised the personnel in the building that the
water would be turned off. It is further contended that Charging
Party became angered and confronted the employee that had called,
among others, and told them that he would retaliate by taking away
the medical supplies, such as band-aids and headache remedies which
were located in their work areas. Respondent asserts that at that
point, the employee who had called to report the lack of water,
reported to Respondent allegations of sexual harassment.
On March 20, 1992, Charging Party was invited to Respondent's
headquarters whereupon he was confronted with the allegations,
wherein Charging Party admitted that he was guilty of hugging and
kissing Respondent's female employees, and that in connection with
the desk incident, he had indeed attempted to exact a kiss as
payment for doing his job. At that interview, it is contended that
Charging Party admitted that he had read Respondent's policy on
sexual harassment. Respondent asserts that it thereafter suspended
Charging Party pending further investigation and was instructed not
to have any further contact with Kennecott's female employees.
Respondent
contends that
it conducted
further
extensive
investigation, engaged in extensive internal review, and attempted
to determine whether Charging Party could be effectively employed
in another location. Respondent contends that there were no jobs
requiring Charging Party's skills which could be performed in
isolation. Therefore, Respondent's contends that its management
determined that Charging Party's conduct was disruptive of the
work-place, that it impinged on employee morale, that it caused
resentment, that it cause inefficiencies in the work-place, that it

provided a poor example, and that it may be viewed as illegal.
Respondent asserts that no one has been hired to replace Charging
Party and Respondent has no intention of replacing him.
ANALYSIS
Charging Party has brought this action against Respondent alleging
violation Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, of 1965, as amended, and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.
A.

Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination

In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
Charging Party must allege and prove the following elements: 1)
that he is a member of a protected class; 2) that he was qualified
for and was performing her job adequately; 3) that he was subjected
to an adverse employment decision based upon his age.
Charging Party is a member of a protected class because he is over
forty years old. Charging Party was qualified and was performing
her job adequately with some exceptions. The record indicates that
a male employee under the age of forty, who was involved in a
similar type of work as Charging Party, was terminated for engaging
in similar kinds of sexual harassment as the Charging Party had
engaged in. The record also indicates that Charging Party was
aware of and understood the Respondent's sexual harassment policy,
has admitted putting his arm around female employees, and in at
least one instance, admitted asking a female employee for a kiss.
Therefore, Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination.
B.

Comparison

Respondent points out that an employee under the age of forty, in
a similar position as Charging Party, was terminated as a result of
similar allegations of sexual harassment.
C.

Respondent's Burden

Although Respondent's burden to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct is relieved by Charging
Party's failure to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination, Respondent's arguments are set out for
completeness.
Respondent contends that Charging Party was terminated as a result
of his violation of Respondent's sexual harassment policies.
Respondent contends that Charging Party has admitted to reading
Respondent's sexual harassment policies.
Respondent further
contends from Charging Party's statement to a female employee after
he requested a kiss from her that "I guess I can't do this or it
would be called sexual harassment," implies that Charging Party was
aware of what constitutes sexual harassment. Furthermore, it is
contended that Charging Party had attempted to or did hug and/or

kiss female co-workers. Respondent asserts that Charging Party's
female co-workers were uncomfortable with being alone with the
Charging Party. Respondent further contends that Charging Party
treated his female co-workers differently regarding supplies and
service, based upon whether or not they were nice to him.
Respondent points out that in early 1991, Respondent terminated the
employment of a janitor, who was under the age of 40, for
unsatisfactory performance and for having engaged in conduct
described as sexual harassment, including making advance to other
female employees, and cornering a female employee in isolated an
area to ask for a kiss. Furthermore, it is asserted that there
were also elements in such employee's record considered too harmful
to place him in any other position.
Respondent also points out that in November of 1991, a Building
Services Technician, under the age of 40, engaged in conduct
described as sexual harassment in that he on several occasions
approached one of the female employees whom he supervised, engaged
in banter of a sexual nature with her, and asked for dates with
her. Such employee was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a
janitor, received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so as
to avoid contact with female employees.
Respondent asserts that Charging Party's performance was
unsatisfactory as a result of the following: (1) Charging Party
disposing of Respondent's property without authorization; (2)
Charging Party taking a vacation without notifying Respondent; (3)
Charging Party allowing a co-employee to leave without maintaining
sufficient support and coverage; (4) Charging Party turning off a
building's water without first notifying co-workers; and (5)
Charging Party engaging in sexual harassment of female co-workers.
Therefore,
Respondent
has
articulated
a
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
D.

Summary

Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination. Therefore, the facts in the record, viewed in
their entirety, indicate that there is NO REASONABLE CAUSE to
believe that Charging Party was subjected to discriminatory
practices as alleged.
This concludes the Division's informal
investigative adjudication procedure.
ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION,

Randall Phillips, Investigator

Date

Jay Fowled mrector
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
UADD Case No. 92-0393
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418
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*

KENNECOTT CORP., a Delaware
Corporation, licensed to do
Dusiness in the State of Utah
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

)n November (3^, 1992, the Anti-Discrimination Division (Division) of the
Cndustrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issued a determination of "No
Reasonable Cause" that the Respondent has not violated the Utah Anti)iscrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code Annotated, as
imended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Ct is hereby ordered that the Charging Party's request for agency action is
iismissed in the above captioned case.
If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a written request for a formal
learing must be filed with the Director of the Division within thirty (30)
lays from the date of the issuance of this Order as specified in Section 3415-7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. A request
'or agency review and a formal hearing will not be considered necessary if
:he hearing will not add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause
:he evidence to be viewed differently. If the Director receives no timely
•equest for a hearing, this Order becomes the final Order of the Commission
rith no further rights of appeal as specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d),
r.C.A.
LS a party to a complaint filed concurrently under Title VII of the Civil
lights Act of 1964, as amended, you have the right to request a Substantial
feight Review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. If you make
uch a request, or pursue any other federal action, you will be barred,
>ursuant to Section 34-35-7.1(16), U.C.A., from commencing or continuing any
djudicative proceeding regarding this complaint before the Utah Antidscrimination Division. For a request for a Substantial Weight Review to be
onored, you mst notify the following within fifteen (15) days of the
ssuance of this Order:
Antonio DeDios, State & Local Coordinator
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
4520 North Central Avenue, Suite 300,
Phoenix, Arizona 85012

ay Fowler/; \ Acting Director

Date

w^>
Erik Strindberg (Bar No. 4154)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South
Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Stephen E. Hausknect

STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISI ON
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT,
Complainant,
vs.

]1

NOTICE OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING

]
l
]

UADD No. 92-0393

\

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
Complainant,

Stephen

E.

Hausknect

(hereinafter

"Hausknect") by and through his undersigned attorney, and pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7, 1(5) (c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah
Administration Code, hereby requests an Evidentiary Hearing on the
Determination rendered by Randall Phillips and Jay Fowler in this
matter.

That Determination concludes that complainant Hausknect

has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
and,

therefore,

there

is

"no

reasonable

cause"

to

believe

complainant was subjected to discriminatory practices. Complainant
Hausknect disagrees with this finding and contends that evidence
produced at a hearing will show not only that he has established a

Exhibit^

prima facie case of age discrimination, but that the respondent
Kennecott Corporation is unable to show that a legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason existed for his termination.
Specific grounds for this Evidentiary Hearing are as
follows:
1.

An Evidentiary Hearing is necessary so that an

adequate and complete investigation can be done.

The investigator

concluded that the evidence did not establish a prima facie case of
age discrimination.

However, evidence readily available to the

investigator would establish that:
a.

Complainant was a member of the protected
group;

b.

He was discharged;

c.

He

was

qualified

to

do

the

job

(having

received a favorable rating twenty (20) days
before his discharge);
d.

The work that he performed

is

now being

performed by an outside contractor and by
certain college-age students.
It is obvious from the investigator' s failure to uncover this
evidence that a hearing is needed so that basic evidence can be
collected and examined;

2

2.

An Evidentiary Hearing is also necessary so that

testimony can be taken from not only the complainant, but from the
other employees who were involved in the termination decision and
surrounding facts.

The determination of the investigator was made

solely on the basis of written statements prepared by legal
counsel.

No affidavits were collected nor interviews conducted by

the investigator.

Rule 560-l-4(A)(4) states that "in most cases,

the need to cross-examine the individuals who have submitted
affidavits supportive of the initial findings or determination of
the Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a
request for a hearing . . . M

Here a hearing is needed so that

crucial evidentiary testimony can be collected in the first place;
3.

The investigator' s decision appears to be based

largely upon the fact that Kennecott,

at one time, had also

terminated an individual under the age of forty (40), who had been
accused of sexual harassment.

However, this analysis ignores two

crucial facts: First, as the investigator acknowledged, that other
individual' s work performance was unsatisfactory.

This is not the

case with the complainant, who had been successfully employed by
Kennecott

for

over

thirty-eight

(38) years.

Secondly,

the

investigator ignores, or brushes aside, the fact that another
employee

under the age of forty

(40) was

accused of sexual

harassment was not fired, but merely transferred.
3

An Evidentiary

Hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and explored
which examines why Mr. Hausknect, a long-time valuable employee was
treated differently than this younger much less senior employee/
and not given the opportunity to transfer.
4.

Evidence was presented in complainant' s charge that

his termination was motivated by Kennecott' s desire to reduce staff
in the facility in which the complainant worked prior to closing it
down.

By doing so, Kennecott would not have to pay significant

severance benefits
investigated

at

to the complainant.

all

by

the

investigator.

This
A

issue was not
hearing would

facilitate the development of this evidence, including providing
crucial information on Kennecott' s policies regarding lay-offs,
benefits and severance pay;
5.
regarding

A hearing is also necessary to produce evidence

Kennecott' s

training

policy.

Kennecott,

and

the

investigator relied heavily on Kennecott' s claim that complainant
knew or should have known that his conduct amounted to sexual
harassment.

There is no supporting documentation or testimony in

the form of affidavits to support Kennecott' s contention that
complainant received any training or counseling in this area.

An

Evidentiary Hearing would allow evidence to be presented on this
very important issue;

4

6.
adequately

Lastly/

an

investigate

Evidentiary

the

alleged

Hearing
basis

is
for

needed

to

Hausknect' s

termination (i.e. - that he harassed a certain female employees)•
No affidavits or documentary evidence taken or examined by the
investigator to support or disprove this key issue (i.e. - that
there was a legitimate reason for complainant's discharge).

An

Evidentiary Hearing is necessary so that evidence and testimony can
be taken on this issue as well.
For

these

reasons,

complainant

requests

that

an

Evidentiary Hearing in this matter be held and that the initial
determination of the investigator not become the final Order of the
Commission.
DATED this

'* day of December, 1992.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.

Erik Strindberg

5
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was hand-delivered, on this J^S day of December/
1992, to the following:
James M. Elegante
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147-08989

feU£jV^\
F: \cb\hausk. eh
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 3 00 South, 3d Floor
P.O. Box 146615
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615
Stephen E. Hausknecht,
Charging Party,
vs.

*
*
*

*
*
*
*
Respondent.
*********************************

Kennecott Corp.,

ORDER
GRANTING
FORMAL
PROCEEDING
UADD NO. 92-0393
NO. 35C-92-0418 (ADEA)

The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above
entitled matter to review de novo the Determination and Order of
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division having been considered, and
it having been determined that the CHARGING PARTY has met the
requirements of law and does:
Show that a hearing will add to the evidence in
the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the
file may be viewed differently by the hearing,
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good
cause for the request,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the
CHARGING PARTY be, and the same is hereby, granted.

/Q*—^<SdL

^

_

Timothy C. Allen,,
Presiding Administrative Law Judge
Certified by the Industrial Commission of
Utah this /^T^day of ~~)T?€OurA.^ 1993.

Patricia O. Ashby, Commissio$>-Secreta

Exhibits

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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S t e v e n E. Hausknecht
Complainant,
vs.

Kennecott Corporation,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)

RESPONSE TO COMPLAINANT'S
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING

)

Civil No. 92-0393

)

* * * * * * * *

Respondent Kennecott Corporation, ("Kennecott") , by and
through counsel and pursuant to § 63-46b-12 (2) , Utah Code Ann.,
hereby

submits its Response to Complainant's Request for an

Evidentiary Hearing ("Request").
Mr. Hausknecht sets forth six arguments in support of
his Request; however, as the following discussion illustrates,
none of those arguments provides a basis to warrant a hearing in
this case.
Mr.

Hausknecht's

first

argument

is

that

"[a]n

evidentiary hearing is necessary so that an adequate and complete

Exhibit^

investigation can be done" and "basic evidence can be collected
and examined-"

Request at 2.

This argument fails for the fol-

lowing three reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is to give the Commission the chance to "review de novo the Director's Determination."
Utah Admin. R. 560-1-4 (3). The purpose of a hearing is not to
conduct an investigation or collect evidence.

That goal is

accomplished by the Industrial Commission Investigator assigned
to the case.
is over.

In other words, the fact finding phase of this case

A thorough and complete investigation took place and

there were no deficiencies in the investigation.
Second,

Mr. Hausknecht

suggests

that he

failed to

introduce the evidence at the investigation stage necessary to
support his claim of discrimination.
complete

However, an adequate and

investigation was conducted by Randall Phillips, the

Industrial Commission Investigator who handled this claim (the
"investigator") , and extensive evidence was collected and examined.

In the five months between the date this claim was filed

and the date the Industrial Commission issued its determination,
the following evidence was collected by the investigator:

(1)

Kennecott's 10 page response which included detailed and complete
answers to a lengthy set of investigative questions, a general
statement, a copy of Kennecott's sexual harassment policy, and 58
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pages of d e t a i l e d notes r e l a t e d t o Kennecott's i n v e s t i g a t i o n of
Mr. Hausknecht's conduct;

(2) Mr. Hausknecht's reply t o Kenne-

cott 's

Kennecott's d e t a i l e d

response;

and

(3)

Hausknecht's reply l e t t e r .

response t o Mr.

In s h o r t , the r e a l i t y in t h i s case i s

t h a t more than j u s t "basic evidence" has been c o l l e c t e d and examined.

Indeed,

record.

e x t e n s i v e evidence has been submitted i n t o

the

The i n v e s t i g a t o r c a r e f u l l y considered t h i s evidence in

making h i s determination.

See "SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION" s e c t i o n

of t h e Determination.

Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's f i r s t argument

i s s p e c i o u s at b e s t .

In f a c t , Mr. Hausknecht in essence admits

t h a t i n t h i s case an adequate i n v e s t i g a t i o n has already been conducted and that the necessary evidence has been submitted when he
s t a t e s t h a t evidence r e l a t e d t o the i s s u e s which he claims must
be

investigated

is

"readily

available

to

the

investigator."

Request a t 2.
Third, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity t o submit
evidence
Hausknecht

at

the

submitted

investigation

stage.

only arguments;

1

he

Nevertheless,
failed

to

submit

Mr.
any

This evidence showed inter a l i a :
(1) Mr. Hausknecht's age had nothing
to do with Kennecott's d e c i s i o n to terminate h i s employment; (2) Kennecott
terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment because he engaged in conduct described
as pervasive sexual harassment and because h i s performance was unsatisfactory;
and (3) Mr. Hausknecht was not subject to disparate treatment ( i n 1991,
Kennecott terminated the employment of a j a n i t o r who was under 40 years old
for engaging in sexual harassment and whose performance was u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ) .
See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; Kennecott's August 20, 1992 Response;
November 20, 1992, Determination.
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facts which would give the investigator a basis to rule in his
favor.

It was not through inadvertence that Mr. Hausknecht

failed to submit any factual evidence to support his claims; the
reality is that his claim is groundless.
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's first argument fails to
warrant a hearing in this case.
Mr. Hausknecht's

second

argument

Admin. R. 560-1-4(A)(4), which provides:

is based

on Utah

"In most cases, the

need to cross-examine the individuals who have submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of the
Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a
request for a hearing by the Commission."

(Emphasis added).

Mr.

Hausknecht argues that "a hearing is needed so that crucial
evidentiary testimony can be taken in the first place."
at 3.

Request

This argument fails for the following three reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to collect evi-

dence.

See discussion above at 2.
Second, this rule is specifically

limited to cases

where there is a need to cross-examine "the individuals who have
submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination."

Utah Admin. R. 560-1-4 (A) (4) .

In the instant case,

as Mr. Hausknecht admits at page 3 of his Request, no such individuals or affidavits exist.

In this case there is no allegation
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and certainly no proof that evidence was in any way suppressed.
The investigator gave Mr. Hausknecht ample opportunity to present
any evidence which he wished in connection with this charge.
Furthermore,

in

this

case

there

were

no

affidavits

and

counter-affidavits so that the veracity of a witness would have
to be determined by a fact finder.

The reality is that com-

pletely unsubstantiated allegations were made by the charging
party and that the responding party replied with concrete evidence to substantiate the reason for the termination of employment.

Therefore, there is no need for the cross-examination con-

templated by this rule.
Third, during the investigation phase, Mr. Hausknecht
had every opportunity to submit any evidence to support his claim
of discrimination, including affidavits. Nevertheless, he chose
not to do so.2 Mr. Hausknecht's complaint that affidavits were
not collected by the investigator does not advance his argument.
If Mr. Hausknecht felt that affidavits were necessary, it was his
duty to submit them into the record.

It is not the duty of the

*
That Mr. Hausknecht would not support his claim with the affidavits of
others is not surprising: His coworkers, mostly females, were the victims of
his sexual misbehavior, so they could hardly be expected to provide support
for his claim. There are no other current or former workers similarly situated to support his specious claim.
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investigator to go out and obtain affidavits in support of Mr.
Hausknecht's claim.
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's second argument fails to
warrant a hearing in this case.
In his third argument, Mr. Hausknecht asserts that a
hearing

is necessary

so that

evidence

can

be produced

and

explored which examines why he was treated differently than a
younger employee who was the subject of a transfer as a result of
his sexually oriented misbehavior.

Request at 3.

This assertion

is premised on Mr. Hausknecht's claim that his work performance
was not unsatisfactory.

Mr. Hausknecht's third argument fails

for the following four reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new
evidence.

See discussion above at 2.
Second, Mr. Hausknect's sexually-oriented conduct was

pervasive.

Kennecott's internal investigation showed that his

conduct was more egregious than the conduct of the employee whose
employment was terminated and much more egregious than the conduct of the employee who was reprimanded and transferred to
another job.

His sexually-oriented activities in and of them-

selves provided a sufficient basis to terminate his employment.
The argument, based on a claim that Mr. Hausknecht,s work performance was not unsatisfactory,

is completely

-6-

contrary to the

facts.
ior ,

However,
Mr,

Hausknect's

Kennecott. 3
tion.

in a d d i t i o n t o h i s o b j e c t i o n a b l e sexual behavwas not

satisfactory

to

See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; Determina-

Therefore,

Hausknecht

job performance

the

differently

issue
than

is

whether Kennecott t r e a t e d Mr.

a younger

employee who,

like

Mr.

Hausknecht, had engaged i n s e x u a l harassment and whose work was
unsatisfactory.

The evidence shows t h a t Kennecott terminated t h e

employment of a j a n i t o r , who i s under the age of 40, because he
engaged in s e x u a l l y o r i e n t e d behavior which was unacceptable and
because h i s work performance was u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .

Id.

Kenne-

c o t t # s treatment of an employee who had engaged in similar behavi o r but whose job performance allowed Kennecott t o t r a n s f e r him
t o another job has l i t t l e r e l e v a n c e t o t h i s c a s e , and a hearing
i s not necessary t o produce and explore evidence r e l a t e d t o t h a t
treatment.

•*
The determinative i s s u e in t h i s case i s whether Kennecott" s motivation
for terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment was discriminatory, i . e . , whether
Kennecott terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment because he i s over 40 years
of age.
Whether Kennecott a c t u a l l y had good cause to terminate Mr.
Hausknecht's employment i s not an i s s u e .
In other words, the correctness or
v a l i d i t y of Kennecott's proffered reasons for terminating Mr. Hausknecht's
employment i s i r r e l e v a n t .
Therefore, whether Hausknecht was a c t u a l l y g u i l t y
of s e x u a l l y unacceptable behavior and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y job performance i s i r r e l evant so long as Kennecott b e l i e v e d he was g u i l t y of these t h i n g s .
The
d i s p o s i t i v e point i s that Kennecott terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment for
reasons (whether based in actual f a c t or not) other than h i s age.
-7-

Third, evidence related to Kennecott's decision to terminate Mr. Hausknecht's employment rather than transferring him
has

already

Response.

been produced.

See Kennecott's June 10, 1992,

That evidence shows that Kennecott determined that Mr.

Hausknecht's activities and

long-standing propensity to exact

special favors from female employees provided a sufficient basis
in and of itself to terminate his employment.
Fourth and finally, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity at the investigation stage to submit evidence, rather than
mere argument, related to this issue and his claim of pretext,
4
but he failed to do so.
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's third argument fails to
warrant a hearing in this case.
Mr. Hausknecht's fourth argument is that a hearing is
necessary to facilitate the development of evidence related to
his allegation that Kennecott terminated his employment to avoid
having to pay him severance benefits.
ment fails because:

Request at 4.

This argu-

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to pro-

duce new evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) the information
contained in the disclosures made by Kennecott to the investigator

demonstrate

precisely

the

See footnote 2, supra.
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basis

upon

which

Kennecott

terminated

the

employment

of

Mr.

Hausknecht;

and

(3) Mr.

Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit evidence to support
his claim relevant to this issue at the investigation stage, but
he failed to do so.

The reality is that no evidence was pre-

sented by the charging party that his termination was motivated
by Kennecott's desire to reduce staff and to save severance benefits.

In fact, this issue did not appear as part of the charge

but was merely an argument raised by the charging party in his
July 22, 1992, reply statement at page 1.

Indeed the extent of

the "evidence" offered was nothing more than a bald suggestion of
Kennecott's motivation.

The facts in the case completely refuted

the suggestion and the charging party did not substantiate the
claim in any way.
Mr. Hausknecht's fifth argument is that a hearing is
necessary

to produce

evidence related

to Kennecott's sexual

harassment policy and his knowledge of it.
argument fails because:

Request at 4.

This

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to

produce new evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it is irrelevant

whether Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual
harassment, 5 see discussion above at n. 3; (3) evidence related

->
It is simply incredible that in the face of his admissions that he was
guilty of hugging and kissing Kennecott's female employees and that in connection with his employment he attempted to extract a kiss as payment for doing
Footnote continued on next page.
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to this issue, including a copy of the policy, was submitted during the investigation, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response;
and (4) Mr- Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit evidence
related to this issue at the investigation stage, but he failed
to do so,
Mr- Hausknecht's sixth and final argument is that a
hearing is needed to investigate and take evidence and testimony
related to one of the alleged bases (sexual harassment) for the
termination of his employmentfails because:

Request at 5.

This argument

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to investi-

gate and produce new evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it
is irrelevant whether Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual harassment, see discussion above at n. 3; (3) extensive and
detailed evidence related to the issue of Mr. Hausknecht's sexual
naughtiness, including 58 pages of notes from Kennecott's investigation, were submitted at the investigation stage, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr. Hausknecht had ample

Footnote continued from previous page.
his job, Mr. Hausknecht would now urge the Commission to hold a hearing to
gather "crucial evidentiary testimony."
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opportunity to submit evidence related to this issue at the
investigation stage, but he did not do so.
In sum, none of Mr. Hausknecht/s arguments provides a
basis for the Commission to set this case for a hearing.

The

Request should be denied.
DATED this V ^ d a y of January, 1993.

1
^AMES M. fej^EGAN
EGANTE
—*"^^ of and for

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

Attorneys for Respondent
Kennecott Corporation

°
One wonders whether at such a hearing Mr. Hausknecht would attempt now
to deny that he engaged in h i s objectionable behavior or whether more evidence
of unacceptable behavior would surface.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO
COMPLAINANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING to the following
on this

day of January, 1993:
Erik Strindberg
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South, #500
P.O. BOX 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-008

Jay Fowler
Acting Director
Industrial Commission of Utah
Antidiscrimination Division
160 East 300 South
P.O. BOX 146640
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6640
Stephen Hadley, Chairman
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146640
Salt Lake City, Utah
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84114-6640

•*1

\~\

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 3 00 South, 3d Floor
O. Box 146615
--..SALT LA#£ CITY, UTAH 84114-6615
Steven E. Hausknecht,

*
*
*

larging Party,

ORDER
SETTING ASIDE
GRANT OF FORMAL
PROCEEDING

Kennecott Corporation,

UADD No. 92-0393

*
*

Respondent.

*

*********************************

The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above
entitled matter to review de novo the Determination and Order of
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division having been considered, and
an Order Granting Formal Proceeding having been issued on March 15,
1993, and further, it having been discovered upon motion by the
respondent that respondent's document captioned Response To
Complainant's Request For An Evidentiary Hearing was not in the
file at the time of consideration of the Order Granting Formal
Proceeding, the Order Granting Formal Proceeding dated March 15,
1993 is hereby set aside, and the charging party's request as well
as the respondent's response will be considered,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the
RESPONDENT be, and the same is hereby granted and the Order
Granting Formal Proceeding is set aside for further consideration.
^

_

_

^

_

/^^A^^^ ZS2^_

Timothy C. Allen
Presiding Administrative Law Judge
Certified by the Industrial Commission of
Utah this AT^day of'"/T^^rvZ^ 1993.
ATTEST:
C

•Wfe ,r> co

Patricia O. Ashb

ssion Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March \^\
, 1993, a copy of the
attached Order Setting Aside Grant of Formal Proceeding, in the
UADD case of Stephen E. Hausknecht vs. Kennecott Corporation, was
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:

Stephen E. Hausknecht
2158 Terra Linda Drive
SLC, UT 84041
Erik Strindberg'
Attorney at Law
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
P O Box 11008
SLC, UT 84147-0008
James M. Elegante
Attorney at Law
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P. O. Box 11898
SLC, UT 84147-0898
Anna R. Jensen
Director
Industrial Commission of Utah
UADD Division
160 East 300 South
SLC, UT 84114-6630

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division

\°\3
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146615
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615

J\\^

/''Steven E. Hausknechl
*

ORDER GRANTING
FORMAL HEARING
UPON FURTHER REVIEW

Charging Party,
*
*
*
*
Respondent.
*********************************

Kennecott Corporation,

UADD NO. 92-0393
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418

The request for an evidentiary hearing, as well as the
response of the respondent, in the above entitled matter to review
de novo the Determination and Order of the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Division having been duly considered, and it having been determined
that the CHARGING PARTY has met the requirements of law and does:
Show that a hearing will add to the evidence in
the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the
file may be viewed differently by the hearing,
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good
cause for the request,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the
CHARGING PARTY be, and the same is hereby, granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
state the date upon which it was mailed; and be sent by mail to the
undersigned, and to each party.

OJM^

len
ministrative Law Judge
Certified by the Industrial Commission of
Utah this^?/. ^ d a y of .jr^y
' h^.P
1993.
ATTEST:

^-J/^D C

M

miss
Patricia 0. Ashbyi Commission
Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on AprilrQCp"^ , 1993, a copy of the
attached Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review, in the
UADD case of Stephen E. Hausknecht vs. Kennecott Corporation, was
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:

Stephen E^ Hausknecht
2158 Terra Linda Drive
SLC, UT 84041
Erik Strindberg
Attorney at Law
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
P O Box 11008
SLC, UT 84147-0008
James M. Elegante
Attorney at Law
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P. O. Box 11898
SLC, UT 84147-0898
Anna R. Jensen
Director
Industrial Commission of Utah
UADD Division
160 East 300 South
SLC, UT 84114-6630

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Byj .KJ±WV>&

Qpth'xA p

Wilma Burrows
Adjudication D i v i s i o n

\QrJVy\

James M. Elegante (0968)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
* * * * * * * *

Steven E. Hausknecht
Complainant,
vs.

)
)
)

MOTION FOR REVIEW

)

Kennecott Corporation,
Respondent.

) UADD No. 92-0393
)

EEOC No. 35C-92-0418

* * * * * * * *

Respondent Kennecott Corporation, ("Kennecott"), by and
through its attorneys and pursuant to § 63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann.,
hereby moves the Industrial Commission to review the correctness of
the Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review ("Order")
issued April 26, 1993, grant the charging party a formal hearing.
This Motion for Review is brought on the grounds that the Order
does not comply with the requirements of Utah law for granting a
formal hearing from a determination and order entered by the AntiDiscrimination Division. Specifically, the Order fails to specify
the basis upon which it is granted and the record does not support
-1-
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the grant of a formal hearing.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
Mr. Hausknecht set forth six arguments in support of his
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing ("Request").

None of those

arguments provided a basis to warrant a hearing in this case.
Mr.

Hausknecht's

first

argument

was

that

M

[a]n

evidentiary hearing is necessary so that an adequate and complete
investigation can be done" and "basic evidence can be collected and
examined."

Request at 2. This argument provided no basis for the

Order for the following reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is to give the Commission
the chance to "review de novo the Directors Determination." Utah
Admin. R. 560-1-4 (3). The purpose of a hearing is not to conduct
an investigation or collect evidence. That goal is accomplished by
the Industrial Commission Investigator assigned to the case.
fact finding phase of this case is over.

The

A thorough and complete

investigation took place and there were no deficiencies in the
investigation.
Second, Mr. Hausknecht

suggested

that he failed to

introduce the evidence at the investigation stage necessary to
support his claim of discrimination.
complete

However, an adequate and

investigation was conducted by Randall Phillips, the

Industrial Commission Investigator who handled this claim (the
"investigator"), and extensive evidence was collected and examined.
In the five months between the date this claim was filed and the
-2-

date the Division issued its determination, the following evidence
was collected by the investigator:

(1) Kennecott's

10 page

response which included detailed and complete answers to a lengthy
set of investigative questions, a general statement, a copy of
Kennecott's sexual harassment policy, and 58

pages of detailed

notes related to Kennecott's investigation of Mr. Hausknecht's
conduct; (2) Mr. Hausknecht's reply to Kennecott's response; and
(3) Kennecott's detailed response to Mr. Hausknecht's reply letter.
Thus, more than just "basic evidence" was collected and examined by
the Division.
record.1

Indeed, extensive evidence was submitted into the

The investigator considered this evidence in making his

determination.

See "SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION" section of the

Determination.

Mr. Hausknecht's first argument was specious at

best and in fact, Mr. Hausknecht in essence admitted that in this
case an adequate investigation was conducted and that the necessary
evidence was submitted, when he stated that evidence related to the
issues which he claimed must be investigated was "readily available
to the investigator."

Request at 2.

Third, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit
1

This evidence showed inter alia: (1) Mr. Hausknecht's age had nothing to do with
Kennecott's decision to terminate his employment; (2) Kennecott terminated Mr.
Hausknecht's employment because he engaged in conduct described as pervasive sexual
harassment and because his performance was unsatisfactory; and (3) Mr. Hausknecht was
not subject to disparate treatment (in 1991, Kennecott terminated the employment of a
janitor who was under 40 years old for engaging in sexual harassment and whose
performance was unsatisfactory). See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; Kennecott's
August 20, 1992 Response; November 20, 1992, Determination.
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evidence at the investigation stage. Nevertheless, Mr. Hausknecht
submitted only arguments; he failed to submit any

facts which

would give the investigator a basis to rule in his favor.

It was

not through inadvertence that Mr. Hausknecht failed to submit any
factual evidence to support his claims; the reality is that his
claim is groundless.
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's first argument failed to
provide a basis to warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Mr. Hausknecht's second argument was based on Utah Admin.
R. 560-1-4 (A) (4) , which provides:

"In most cases, the need to

cross-examine

have

supportive

of

the
the

individuals
initial

who

finding

or

submitted

affidavits

determination

of

the

Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a request
for a hearing

by

the Commission."

(Emphasis

added).

Mr.

Hausknecht argued in the Request that "a hearing is needed so that
crucial evidentiary testimony can be taken in the first place."
Request at 3.

This argument similarly provided no basis for the

Order for the following reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to collect evidence.

See discussion above at 2.
Second, this rule is specifically limited to cases where

there

is a need

to cross-examine

"the

individuals who have

submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination." Utah Admin. R. 560-1-4(A)(4).
-4-

In the instant case, as

Mr. Hausknecht admitted at page 3 of his Request, no such individuals or affidavits exist.

In this case there is no allegation

and certainly no proof that evidence was in any way suppressed.
The investigator gave Mr. Hausknecht ample opportunity to present
any evidence which he wished in connection with this charge.
Furthermore, in this case there were no affidavits and counteraffidavits so that the veracity of a witness would have to be
determined by a fact finder.

The reality is that completely

unsubstantiated allegations were made by the charging party and
that

the responding

substantiate

the

party replied with

reason

for

the

concrete

termination

of

evidence to
employment.

Therefore, there is no need for the cross-examination contemplated
by this rule.
Third, during the investigation phase, Mr. Hausknecht
had every opportunity to submit any evidence to support his claim
of discrimination, including affidavits.

Nevertheless, he chose

not to do so.2 Mr. Hausknecht's complaint that affidavits were not
collected by the investigator does not advance his argument.

If

Mr. Hausknecht felt that affidavits were necessary, it was his duty
to submit them into the record.

It is not the duty of the

investigator to go out and obtain affidavits in support of Mr.
2

That Mr. Hausknecht would not support his claim with the affidavits of others is
not surprising: His coworkers, mostly females, were the victims of his sexual misbehavior,
so they could hardly be expected to provide support for his claim. There are no other
current or former workers similarly situated to support his specious claim.
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Hausknecht's claim.
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's second argument failed to
warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the Administrative Law
Judge•
In his third argument, Mr. Hausknecht asserted that a
hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and explored
which examines why he was treated differently than a younger
employee who was the subject of a transfer as a result of his
sexually oriented misbehavior.

Request at 3.

This assertion is

premised on Mr. Hausknecht's claim that his work performance was
not unsatisfactory.

Mr. Hausknecht's third argument likewise

provided no basis for the Order for the following reasons.
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new
evidence.

See discussion above at 2.
Second, Mr. Hausknecht/s sexually-oriented conduct was

pervasive.

Kennecott's internal investigation showed that his

conduct was more egregious than the conduct of the employee whose
employment was terminated and much more egregious than the conduct
of the employee who was reprimanded and transferred to another job.
His sexually-oriented activities in and of themselves provided a
sufficient basis to terminate his employment.
on

a

claim

that

Mr.

Hausknecht's

work

The argument, based

performance

unsatisfactory, is completely contrary to the

was not

facts. However, in

addition to his objectionable sexual behavior, Mr. Hausknecht's job

-6-

performance was not satisfactory to Kennecott.3
June 10, 1992, Response; Determination.

See Kennecott's

Therefore, the issue is

whether Kennecott treated Mr. Hausknecht differently than a younger
employee who, like Mr. Hausknecht, had engaged in sexual harassment
and whose work was unsatisfactory.

The evidence shows that

Kennecott terminated the employment of a janitor, who is under the
age of 40, because he engaged in sexually oriented behavior which
was

unacceptable

unsatisfactory.

and

because

his

work

performance

was

Id. Kennecott's treatment of an employee who had

engaged in similar behavior but whose job performance allowed
Kennecott to transfer him to another job has little relevance to
this case, and a hearing is not necessary to produce and explore
evidence related to that treatment.
Third, evidence related to Kennecott's decision to terminate Mr. Hausknecht'& employment rather than transferring him has
already been produced.

See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response.

That evidence shows that Kennecott determined that Mr. Hausknecht's

3

The determinative issue in this case is whether Kennecott's motivation for
terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment was discriminatory, i.e., whether Kennecott
terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment because he is over 40 years of age. Whether
Kennecott actually had good cause to terminate Mr. Hausknecht's employment is not an
issue. In other words, the correctness or validity of Kennecott's proffered reasons for
terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment is irrelevant. Therefore, whether Hausknecht
was actually guilty of sexually unacceptable behavior and unsatisfactory job performance is
irrelevant so long as Kennecott believed he was guilty of these things. The dispositive point
is that Kennecott terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment for reasons (whether based in
actual fact or not) other than his age.
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activities and long-standing propensity to exact special favors
from female employees provided a sufficient basis in and of itself
to terminate his employment.
Fourth and finally, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity
at the investigation stage to submit evidence, rather than mere
argument, related to this issue and his claim of pretext, but he
failed to do so.4
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's third argument failed to
warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the Administrative Law
Judge•
Mr. Hausknecht's fourth argument was that a hearing is
necessary to facilitate the development of evidence related to his
allegation that Kennecott terminated his employment to avoid having
to pay him severance benefits. Request at 4. This argument fails
because:

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new

evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) the information contained
in

the

disclosures

made

by

Kennecott

to

the

demonstrated precisely the basis upon which Kennecott

investigator
terminated

the employment of Mr. Hausknecht; and (3) Mr. Hausknecht had ample
opportunity to submit evidence to support his claim relevant to
this issue at the investigation stage, but he failed to do so. The
reality is that no evidence was presented by the charging party

See footnote 2, supra.
-8-

that his termination was motivated by Kennecotts desire to reduce
staff and to save severance benefits.

In fact, this issue did not

appear as part of the charge but was merely an argument raised by
the charging party in his July 22, 1992, reply statement at page 1.
Indeed the extent of the "evidence" offered was nothing more than
a bald suggestion of Kennecott's motivation. The facts in the case
completely refuted the suggestion and the charging party did not
substantiate the claim in any way.
Mr. Hausknecht's fifth argument was that a hearing is
necessary

to

produce

evidence

related

to Kennecott's

sexual

harassment policy and his knowledge of it. Request at 4. Like the
other arguments, this argument could not form the basis of the
Order because:

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new

evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it is irrelevant whether
Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual harassment,5 see
discussion above at n. 3; (3) evidence related
including

a

copy

of

the

policy,

was

to this issue,

submitted

during

the

investigation, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr.
Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit evidence related to this
issue at the investigation stage, but he failed to do so.
Mr. Hausknecht's sixth and final argument was that a
5

It is simply incredible that in the face of his admissions that he was guilty of
hugging and kissing Kennecott's female employees and that in connection with his
employment he attempted to extract a kiss as payment for doing his job, Mr. Hausknecht
would now urge the Commission to hold a hearing to gather "crucial evidentiary testimony-"
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hearing is needed to investigate and take evidence and testimony
related to one of the alleged bases (sexual harassment) for the
termination of his employment.
because:

Request at 5. This argument fails

(1) the purpose of a hearing is not to investigate and

produce new evidence, see discussion above at 2;

(2) it is

irrelevant whether Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual
harassment, see discussion above at n. 3;

(3) extensive and

detailed evidence related to the issue of Mr. Hausknecht's sexual
naughtiness, including 58 pages of notes from Kennecott's investigation, were submitted at the investigation stage, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr. Hausknecht had ample
opportunity to submit evidence related to this issue at the
investigation stage, but he did not do so.6
In sum, none of Mr. Hausknecht's arguments provided any
basis whatsoever for the Administrative Law Judge to set this case
for a hearing.

The Request for a hearing should have been denied.

It is not sufficient for an Administrative Law Judge merely to
recite the law and to find merely that the law has been met when
specific bases for the formal adjudication have been asserted by
the charging party and those bases have each been completely
rebutted by the Responding Party.

6

One wonders whether at such a hearing Mr. Hausknecht would attempt now to
deny that he engaged in his objectionable behavior or whether more evidence of
unacceptable behavior would surface.
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RELIEF REQUESTED
The Commission

should

issue

its order vacating the

Administrative Law Judge/s Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon
Further Review and denying a formal hearing on the charge*
DATED this 12 — day of May, 1993.

1ES M. ELEGANT]
ELEGANTE
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
Kennecott Corporation
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to the following on this )2J^ day of May, 1993:
Erik Strindberg
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East 100 South, #500
P.O. BOX 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-008
Anna R. Jensen
Director
Industrial Commission of Utah
Antidiscrimination Division
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146640
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6640
Stephen Hadley, Chairman
Industrial Commission of Utah
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P.O. Box 146640
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6640
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